Showing posts with label program trading. Show all posts
Showing posts with label program trading. Show all posts

Thursday, July 23, 2009

Lime Brokerage: "The Next 'Long Term Capital' Meltdown Will Happen In A Five-Minute Time Period."

A recent Bloomberg piece that for some reason was made available only to terminal subscribers, provides a very interesting discussion on the dangers of sponsored access, how the associated pre-trade vs post-trade monitoring deliberations by "regulators" will influence short selling curbs, and not surprisingly, the desire by Goldman to not only dominate this yet another aspect of high-frequency trading, but to dictate market policy at will.

What is sponsored access:

In sponsored access, a broker-dealer lends its market participation identification (MPID) number to clients for them to trade on exchanges without going through the broker's trading system, to avoid slowing down the execution. That places responsibility on the broker-dealer to make sure the participant abides by securities regulations, and that its trading, which can involve hundreds or thousands of orders a second, does not run amok.

Is it thus surprising, that none other than Goldman Sachs is muscling its way into providing not only a sponsored access platform to its clients, but a new form of sponsored access that needs the blessing of regulators:

Wall Street heavyweight Goldman Sachs, now launching its own sponsored-access service to lend clients its identification to access securities exchanges directly, said last week it favors monitoring client orders prior to execution.

"Our view is that there is a real need for pre-trade checks in the use of sponsored access to fulfill [broker-dealers'] regulatory responsibilities," said Greg Tusar, managing director at Goldman.

Goldman's stand in favor of pre-trade instead of post-trade monitoring of sponsored clients' activity is one side of a debate in which regulators may choose a middle ground. The regulators' decision on how to monitor sponsored access may also influence their deliberations on restricting short sales.

What is the difference between pre-trade and post-trade monitoring? In brief:

Pre-trade

  • Compliant with Reg SHO
  • Nip problems before they happen
  • View activity across exchanges

Post-trade

  • Faster order executions
  • Pre-trade systems still fallible

And another tidbit:

In traditional sponsored-access arrangements, a broker-dealer determines a client's suitability to access market centers directly and then allows the client to trade without monitoring its individual orders prior to execution.

In other words, the Goldman endorsed pre-trade approach will allow "monitoring of individual orders prior to execution." Whether or not pre-trade checks provide the capacity to observe not just wholesale exchange activity in the context of sponsored access but from a much broader market angle is a discussion for another time, although this could be one place where Sergey Aleynikov could shed an infinite amount of light, especially as pertains to Goldman's sponsored-access service. Conveniently, his gag order will prevent him from saying much if anything until such time as there is an appetizing settlement to keep him gagged in perpetuity. The bottom line is that with a pre-trade environment, the sponsored access providers will be able to have the potential to front run all those who use their platforms. The residual question of how far they go to comply with regulations to prevent this from happening, and remain true to their ethics standards is also a topic for another day.

Going back to the topic at hand. Here is why sponsored access could easily be quite a bother to capital markets sooner rather than later:

Unchecked errors or unintended repeat orders could deplete broker- dealers' capital, and potentially wreak havoc in the broader market. Concerns have arisen, however, about whether all broker-dealers are able to fulfill that duty in today's electronic trading environment, and according to which standards.

And here Goldman chimes in to not only promote their proposed architecture but to expound on the virtues of pre-trade checking.

"In the case of high-frequency trading, in particular guarding against technology failures, oversized orders and other situations where there's potentially systemic market impact, we believe strongly that pre-trade checks are a prerequisite," Tusar says.

Nasdaq's proposal as well as Securities and Exchange Commission officials' speeches a few months ago appeared to lean toward bolstering the traditional approach.

"We don't believe that's strong enough or what the regulators want now, because of the potentially dire consequences, and because we-as broker-dealers-bear much of that risk," Tusar says.

Now the reason why this is very relevant in the context of not just potential front running, but also market structure is that Regulation SHO, which is the primary regulatory framework for short selling (and the purvey of potential Uptick Rule reinstatement, which will happen once the market is allowed to hit a bid) is a post-trade architecture.

Wedbush [Morgan] routinely tests clients' systems to ensure they are compliant with Reg SHO. In addition, he says, the brokerage sets limits on clients available locates-as well as credit and trading limits--before the start of each trading day that its system tracks, prohibiting shorts without locates and providing a type of pre-trade check.

Or as has recently become the case, seeing rolling buy ins in the middle of the day as borrowable shares in even the most liquid stocks mysteriously disappear (look at today's market action for yet another blatant example of this practice).

Anticipating the regulators' likely response, one should not be surprised to see them siding with Goldman and against shorters:

As the SEC also seeks to appease investor concerns over rampant short selling, especially naked short selling, new sponsored-access standards may provide part of the solution. Given that day-traders may be the last remaining culprits of such activity,, increasing and standardizing scrutiny over their trading may reduce uncovered (and illegal) shorts even further.

How about appeasing concerns over rampant, unjustified buying? When will the downtick buy rule be implemented? But we jest.

And I digress again. Why should all this be concerning to advocates of stability of high-frequency trading:

The mother of all concerns is a sponsored firm's algorithm going awry and executing thousands of problematic trades across a range of securities and market centers.

Well, this is not really a problem when it happens to the upside as has been the case for months now - it is only a threat when Joe Sixpack's 401(k) may be impacted, i.e., to the downside.

And here is where a SEC Comment submitted by broker Lime Brokerage is a very troubling must read by all who naively claim that High-frequency trading is a boon to an efficient market (which doesn't provide . Well, yes and no - it is, until such moment that it causes the market to, literally, break. I will post a critical excerpt from the Lime submission, and leave the rest to our readers' independent analysis:

Lime's familiarity with high speed trading allows us to benchmark some of the fastest computer traders on the planet, and we have seen CDT (Computerized Day Trading) order placement rates easily exceed 1,000 orders per second. Should a CDT algorithm go awry, where a large amount of orders are placed erroneously or where the orders should not have passed order validation, the Sponsor will incur a substantial timelag in addressing the issue. From the moment the Sponsor’s representative detects the problem until the time the problematic orders can be addressed by the Sponsor, at least two mintues will have passed. The Sponsor’s only tools to control Sponsored Access flow are to log into the Trading Center’s website (if available), place a phone call to the Trading Center, or call the Sponsee to disable trading and cancel these erroneous orders – all sub-optimal processes which require human intervention. With a two minute delay to cancel these erroneous orders, 120,000 orders could have gone into the market and been executed, even though an order validation problem was detected previously. At 1,000 shares per order and an average price of $20 per share, $2.4 billion of improper trades could be executed in this short timeframe. The sheer volume of activity in a concentrated period of time is extremely disruptive to the process of maintaining a “fair and orderly” market. This shortcoming needs to be addressed if the practice of Naked Access is going to be permitted to continue; otherwise, the next “Long Term Capital” meltdown will happen in a five-minute time period.



And here is the punchline: our wise exchanges and broker-dealers have already set the stage for an outcome that will be extremely disadvantageous to anyone who is not a member of the "club." The strawman is total market collapse (which will happen sooner or later regardless) - just look at this chart from the CME indicating the phenomenal growth in prop trading across clients and the increasing domination of computerized trading:

So in essence the forced choice to regulators and traders by the likes of Goldman and exchanges it the following: pre-trade clearance, i.e., seeing ahead of all trades for entities who use sponsored access, a platform that all will soon need to be used be everyone who wishes to remain competitive in this day and age where one extra millisecond of latency over a long enough timeline renders a speculator (or basically trader, now that "buy and hold" is dead) useless, or the threat of complete market collapse. In other words: do what we want or the repercussions will destroy the free market.

It is time to call the bluff on all these alternatives by the administration and by Wall Street that have the apocalypse as one of the two options.

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Monday, July 20, 2009

This Message Brought To You By Goldman Sachs' Noble Liquidity Provisioning Team

Charlie Gasparino's recap of his behind the scenes meeting with Van Praag - apparently Goldman's most recent noble cause: "Providing liquidity" and their "proclivity for electronic trading." Odd... So odd.

Oh Michelle, as for the Nasdaq opening every morning just fine, maybe you should read this Bloomberg article from earlier today :

By Adam Ewing
July 20 (Bloomberg) -- NASDAQ OMX markets in Sweden, Finland and Denmark have resumed trading after failing to open on time this morning, delaying the start of trading by nearly 30 minutes.
“The markets are up and running,” Anna Rasin, a NASDAQ OMX spokeswoman in Stockholm, said by telephone. “There is still a problem with the data dissemination system, but if you are trading, you can still see quotes and prices.”
Rasin said there was a fire in a data room over the weekend, adding it is unclear whether that was the cause of today’s problems.
The Dow Jones Nordic 30 Index, a measure for the region, rose 59.16, or 1.2 percent, to 5,027.7 as of 9:59 a.m. in Stockholm. Norway’s OBX Index gained 1.7 percent, while Finland’s Helsinki 25 Index advanced 1.2 percent. The OMX Stockholm 30 rose 0.8 percent. The Copenhagen OMX 20 Index also increased 0.8 percent.

Seems Zero Hedge is not the only one in need of backup servers.

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Friday, July 17, 2009

Goldman Sachs Principal Transactions Update: Humming Nicely

Goldman principal PT shares transacted increased by over 40% from the prior week: 550 million to 765 million, clocking at near 50% of total NYSE principal volume - about par for the course. Out of the top 15 most active NYSE traders, 5 have completely given up trading for principal accounts. More interestingly, 8 did no trades for customer facilitation purposes, while agency trades have surprisingly picked up steam, with Morgan Stanley claiming the throne in that category. Total PT was at 33.6%, 7% higher than the 52 week average: also little surprise there.

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Goldman's $4 Billion High Frequency Trading Wildcard

A recent story in Advanced Trading goes after some of the minutae of High Frequency Trading and provides a glimpse of the total value that HFT may provide to behemoth PT powerhouses such as Goldman Sachs. The article presents a very valuable perspective on just why HFT is so critical these days, especially when cash traders go for 6 hour Starbucks breaks between 10 am and 3:30 pm: "high frequency trading firms, which represent approximately 2% of the 20,000 or so trading firms operating in the US markets today, account for 73% of all US equity trading volume. These companies include proprietary trading desks for a small number of major investment banks, less than 100 of the most sophisticated hedge funds and hundreds of the most secretive prop shops, all of which operate with one thing in mind—capture profit opportunities by being smarter and faster than the closest competition." And as the market keeps going up day in and day out, regardless of the deteriorating economic conditions, it is just these HFT's that determine the overall market direction, usually without fundamental or technical reason. And based on a few lines of code, retail investors get suckered into a rising market that has nothing to do with green shoots or some Chinese firms buying a few hundred extra Intel servers: HFTs are merely perpetuating the same ponzi market mythology last seen in the Madoff case, but on a massively larger scale. When it all blows up, the question is whether the SEC will go after the perpetrators of this pyramid with the same zeal that it pursued Madoff himself. We think not.

The reason for this, as the AT article points out, is that HFT has become the biggest cash cow for Wall Street: "The incredible capabilities offered by technology have given meteoric rise to a relatively few high frequency proprietary trading firms that now wield far greater influence on the markets today than most people recognize." How big of a cash cow:

"Proprietary trading takes in a number of unique strategies, including market making, arbitrage (ETFs, futures, options), pairs trading and others based on the linked trading of more than one asset class, e.g., futures index and cash equities. In fact, TABB Group estimates that annual aggregate profits of low latency arbitrage strategies exceed $21 billion, spread out among the few hundred firms that deploy them."

The $21 billion estimate is smack in the middle of the FIXProtocol estimated $15-$25 billion in revenue that HFT generates. So let's do a back of the envelope calculation: Goldman controls roughly 50-60% of principal program trading on the NYSE, which in turn accounts for 30% of all global program trading. Throw in Goldman's domination of dark pool trading through Sigma X, and one can come up to quite a sizable number - It would not be a stretch to conclude that, through various conduits, Goldman is directly responsible for over 20% of global HFT trading. 20% of $21 billion is over $4 billion a year. As margins on HFT are sky high (it doesn't cost all that much to tweak a few hundred lines of code - and if Sergey Aleynikov is any indication, $400,000/year for VPs in the program is peanuts for a firm like Goldman), this $4 billion likely drops to the bottom line almost dollar for dollar. Let's recall that Goldman's Q2 earnings were $3.44 billion. Does this mean that HFT/PT accounts for roughly 25% of earnings for the firm that is a hedge fund in all but FDIC backing? Zero Hedge would in fact take the over, especially in this environment where M&A fees are a distant memory. We leave this question open, but even if we are off, it would not be by order of magnitude, and would explain why Goldman has thrown the kitchen sink into dominating such NYSE programs as the SLP, and is expending so much energy to dominate dark pools as well.

Going back to the AT article, which provides some additional critical observations, especially with regard to the Aleynikov arrest and his ludicrous $750,000 bail which surpasses that of indicted Ponzier Sir Allen Stanford:

First, strategies that optimize the value of high frequency algorithmic trading are highly dependent on ultra-low latency. The right decisions are based on flowing information into your algorithm microseconds sooner than your competitors. To realize any real benefit from implementing these strategies, a trading firm must have a real-time, colocated, high-frequency trading platform—one where data is collected, and orders are created and routed to execution venues in sub-millisecond times.

Next, since many of these strategies require transacting in more than one asset class and across multiple exchanges often located hundreds of miles apart, i.e., NY to Chicago, that infrastructure will often require roundtrip long haul connectivity between the data centers. [TD:Any real estate professionals out there who can determine just how easy it is to set up a colocated station within millisecond distance of the NYSE, and whether or not Goldman has any rights of first refusal on this real estate optionality? Nothing like a little derivative monopoly to keep potential SLP vendors at bay]

Lastly and most importantly, this code has a limited shelf life, whose competitive advantage is diluted with each second it is outstanding. While a prop desk's high level trading strategy may be consistent over time, the micro-level strategies are constantly altered—growing stale after a few days if not sooner—for two important reasons. Firstly, because high frequency trading depends on ridiculously precise interaction of markets and mathematical correlations between securities, traders need to regularly adjust code—sometimes slightly, sometimes more—to reflect the subtle changes in the dynamic market. The speed and volatility of today's markets is such that the relationships forming the core of our algorithm strategies often change within seconds of our ability to implement the very strategies that exploit them. Secondly, competitive intelligence is so good across all rival trading firms that each is exposed to the increasing susceptibility of their strategies being reverse engineered, turning their most profitable ideas into their most risky. As a result, any firm acquiring the "stolen" code would gain benefit from it for no more than a few days before that firm would need to adjust the code to the dynamic conditions. Since these changes build on themselves, in a matter of weeks that code would look quite different from that which was originally "stolen."

And the conclusion:

There's no doubt that Goldman Sachs, or any other proprietary trading firm, could indeed lose tens of millions of dollars from its proprietary trading if their strategies are stolen—and that is very serious. The competitors that obtain access to these trading secrets could (and would) use it to front run or trade against it, ruining even the most well-planned tactics. This news story contains many very important sub-plots: trading espionage, the necessity for a trading firm to have sophisticated security systems built around its technology, the requirements for risk management, and even the potential for proprietary trading software to be targeted on a wider scale for terrorist activity; but more than anything else it highlights the critical role played by high frequency prop trading in this new market.

This is indeed, a conclusion that Zero Hedge has been pounding the table on for months. It is imperative that Wall Street firms shed much more light into this astronomically profitable yet highly misunderstood and under the radar concept. In the absence of more information, the likelihood that Wall Street firms who dominate order flow and have material unfair advantages over virtually everyone else, should be isolated from trading up to the point where they provide sufficient information to make the market a fair and equal playing field for all investors. Until that moment, investing, trading and speculating is doomed to have the same outcome for the majority of market participants as playing roulette with 35 instances of 00, a much lower fun coefficient and no ability to be comped for your room in light of significant trading losses.

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Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Introduction To High Frequency Finance

In the absence of anything else being even remotely relevant in today's market, here is some good bedside reading on this increasingly more pertinent topic.



An Introduction to High-Frequency Finance -

h/t Economics of Contempt.

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Sunday, July 12, 2009

JP Morgan: "High Frequency Predator Traders Feast Upon The Signals Of Others"

When JP Morgan discusses high frequency trading, people listen. When the head of JP Morgan's algorithmic product desk Carl Carries says that high frequency trading is merely a form of parastic market making, people should run for the hills (not in the least due to JP Morgan's proficiency in transforming theory to practice especially as it pertains to various daily trading patterns in the SPY).

"The print that a Dark Pool leaves in its wake does not signal an aggressive buyer or seller as would a sweep, so the information leakage is reduced accordingly. Reduction of information leakage minimizes adverse price movement created by predators like high frequency traders who feast upon the signals of others."





And a few more questions to add to the ever increasing roster of queries for the NYSE (Mr. Pellecchia- maybe the time has come to provide at least some answers?): some dark pools have banned use of third party algorithms in accessing them in order to prevent harm to their institutional clients. Why is this good for dark pools, but not NYSE?

Trader Magazine reports Pipeline Trading banned third party algo's from accessing its dark pool. http://www.securitiesindustry.com/news/-23514-1.html "Algorithm Switching Engine was introduced in October 2007, six months after Pipeline Trading banned third-party algorithms from accessing its own electronic block trading market.... Pipeline claims to be more effective than competitors in finding block matches because of its 50,000-share average execution size; large block orders are executed automatically without the possibility of sniffing out institutional interest with a small probing order."

Trader Magazine reports that ITG has banned third party algo's from accessing its dark pool POSIT. http://www.tradersmagazine.com/issues/20_275/100083-1.html "Investment Technology Group, for the second time, has banned broker-dealers from accessing its POSIT crossing system via algorithms.... ITG chief executive and president Robert Gasser told analysts on the day of the decision that 'third-party dark aggregation has not been beneficial to our institutional POSIT constituency.'... Heckman told Traders Magazine that some brokers offering customers algorithmic access to POSIT appeared to give preference to their own or other liquidity through the algos. He said that adversely impacted the order flow POSIT received."

hat tip Richard

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The Aleynikov Code Dump Uncovered

Sergey Aleynikov's code dump page has been uncovered, courtesy of the Sergey Aleynikov Fan Club on Facebook. The site can be found here. Intrepid hackers, nascent program traders, Goldman lawyers and DHS lackeys should be all over this. As Zero Hedge will be out of pocket for the next few hours, it might make sense for a reader to create a mirror of the content as I have a sinking suspicion this Google page will be taken down faster than Tila Tequila's modesty.The Google Code linked wiki page is already responding with a 502 Server Error and it is odd that this page has not also been removed.

Among the projects on the Code site include:

The Erlang Plus Interface library (EPI) is a tool set of C++ classes to easily build applications in C++ what comunicates with Erlang. The intention of the library is to cover the holes that EI library offers:

  • An object oriented implementation
  • A simple API
  • Extensibility
  • Abstraction of comunication mechanism
  • Simplified management of incoming messages (mailboxes)
The Which Sergey was allegedly putting together in conjunction with user "Keymon."
There is also a sole sourced, undescribed project called Svnarchive, which links to a dead-end command line access viewer.
The biggest project is Erlocaml, described as a tight bridge between Erlang and OCaml. Listed project owners in addition to Sergey are Ulf.Wiger, Cyril.romain, Joelr1, and Chris.romain.
I hope some of our enterprising readers take the time to make some sense of all this code in my immediate absence. While the probability of a smoking gun contained here is marginal at best, strangers things have happened.
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Saturday, July 11, 2009

"Predators Sensing Your Orders: Trading “Battlebots” Earn Est. $15-25 Billion Annually"

The last must read presentation in this Program Trading infused weekend day.

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Liquidity Quality In A Changing Market

My focus on various topics in the realm of program trading and market liquidity has engendered quite a few vitriolic responses, some of which have argued bitterly that Zero Hedge is on the wrong path in describing the somewhat vampiric qualities of liquidity extraction by recent artificial constructs, most notably those undertaken by the NYSE. I present to our readers an original paper by two BNY ConvergEx managing directors from 2007 which should provide some additional datapoints in the great debate on whether or not liquidity benefits at all from the recent domination of computers in the "open" market, and touches on other such highly contested issues as dark pool and dark liquidity value and execution.

I want to bring our readers' attention particularly to Exhibit 4 which indicates that from a liquidity standpoint, intra-day prop trading is the worst (Goldman Sachs domination anyone?) followed by black box algo and automated market making.


In essence these observations dovetail with the findings in a recent guest post by Joe Saluzzi.

I would also like to bring attention to the finding on page 27, according to which intra-day prop trading and black box trading is low quality because both compete with long and intermediate term traders for the best price. "From the portfolio manager’s and trader’s perspective, these are sources of low-quality liquidity that can be viewed as competition for buying or selling a stock at the best price." Maybe in this more theoretical light, it is useful to again readdress the very pertinent complaint that the NASDAQ launched against the NYSE SLP program which has as of yet still generated no response either by the exchange or by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

BNY Beyond Execution 2007 Fall

Hat tip Richard

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Friday, July 10, 2009

Rogue Algorithms And Other Mutually Assured Destruction Program Trading Alternatives

Submitted By Joe Saluzzi Of Themis Trading

Why Institutional Investors Should Be Concerned About High Frequency Traders

By Sal L. Arnuk and Joseph Saluzzi

A Themis Trading LLC Mini White Paper

It is now generally understood that high frequency traders (HFTs) are dominating the equity market, generating as much as 70% of the volume.

HFTs are computerized trading programs that make money two ways, in general. They offer bids in such a way so as to make tiny amounts of money from per share liquidity rebates provided by the exchanges. Or they make tiny per share long or short profits. While this might sound like small change, HFTs collectively execute billions of shares a day, making it an extremely profitable business.

Why should institutional or retail investors care? After all, aren’t HFTs adding liquidity? That’s what they and the exchanges, who court their business, say.

There’s a lot to worry about.

1. HFTs provide low quality liquidity.

In the old days, when NYSE specialists or NASDAQ market makers added liquidity, they were required to maintain a fair and orderly market, and to post a quote that was part of the National Best Bid and Offer a minimum percentage of time. HFTs have no such requirements. They have no minimum shares to provide nor do they have a minimum quote time. And they could turn off their liquidity at any time. When an HFT computer spots a real order, the HFT is not likely to go against it and take the other side. The institution is then faced with a very tough stock to trade.

2. HFT volume can generate false trading signals.

This can cause other investors to buy at a higher price, or sell at a lower price, than they would otherwise. A spike in HFT volume can cause an institutional algorithm order based on a percentage of volume to be too aggressive. A spike can attract momentum investors, further exaggerating price moves. Seeing such a spike, options traders can start to build positions, which, in turn, can attract risk arbitrage traders who believe there’s potential news that could affect the stock.

3. HFT computer servers are faster than other trading systems.

Because most HFT servers are co-located at exchanges, they can beat out institutional or retail orders, causing them to pay more or sell for less than they should have for a stock.

Then there are the “what if” problems that could be created by HFTs.

1. What if a regulation like the uptick rule were enacted?

Volumes could implode and stocks that appeared highly liquid could become extremely difficult to trade with wide spreads and no depth in the quote.

2. What if a “rogue” algorithm entered the market?

Many HFTs are hedge funds that enter their orders into the market through a “sponsored access” arrangement with a broker. Many of these arrangements do not have any pre-trade risk controls since these clients demand the fastest speed. Due to the fully electronic nature of the equity markets today, one keypunch error could wreak havoc. Nothing would be able to stop a market destroying order once the button was pressed.

Gives new meaning to the term “mutually assured destruction?” Sphere: Related Content

Goldman Sachs Principal Transactions Update: 60% Decline

The most recent, presumably correct, data has been released by the NYSE: Goldman total principal program trading has declined by 60% from 1,336 million shares in the prior week to 571 million in the current. The end of the Russell rebalancing likely played a major role in the decline as overall NYSE program trading volume was also impacted by a comparable margin. Yet what was odd is that last week's Russell indexing action was the lowest volume rebalancing event in years.

Nonetheless, even with the material decline in overall program trading, it still accounted for 38% of the NYSE weekly volume, 12% higher than the running 52 week average. With the ever increasing dominance (I plan on summarizing the most recent three months' PT action early next week) of program trading, is it any wonder why all of a sudden even the MSM is expressing such persistent interest into not only peripheral personnel scandals associated with program trading but the core issues as well.

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Tuesday, July 7, 2009

NYSE Issues Correction, Goldman PT Volume Double Of Second Broker

The NYSE has officially released the correction for its lapse in reporting Goldman Sachs' program trading numbers last week.
NEW YORK , July 7, 2009 --The New York Stock Exchange today issued a correction of the program-trading-data press release issued on Thursday, July 2, 2009. Due to an NYSE system error, Goldman, Sachs & Co. was inadvertently omitted from the chart of most active firms, but the firm’s program activity was included in the total level of programs as a percentage of NYSE volume, which remains unchanged at 48.6 percent. Certain of the other data are revised on the press release below, and on the attached chart, incorporating the omitted data as well as subsequent minor corrections relating to other firms.

The data indicated that during June 22-26, program trading amounted to 48.6 percent of NYSE average daily volume of 3,449.8 million shares1, or 1,675.7 million program shares traded per day (Revised from 1,678.3 million program shares traded per day).

Program trading encompasses a wide range of portfolio-trading strategies involving the purchase or sale of a basket of at least 15 stocks.

In all markets, program trading by member firms averaged 4,896.3 million shares a day during June 22-26 (Revised from 4,898.9 million shares a day). About 34.2 percent of program trading took place on the NYSE (Revised from 34.3 percent of program trading), 0.3 percent in non-U.S. markets and 65.5 percent in other domestic markets, including Nasdaq, NYSE Amex and regional markets.

1 The NYSE calculates program trading as the sum of shares bought, sold and sold short in program trades. The total of these shares is divided by the sum of shares bought, sold and sold short on the NYSE including its crossing sessions.

Contact: Ray Pellecchia
Phone: 212.656.2001
Email: rpellecchia@nyx.com
Here is the corrected PT report for the Russell rebalance week. How a "system error" can lead to the drop of the firm that traded nearly 3 billion shares, yet have the Goldman numbers actually flow thru for aggregation purposes, is an open question.



Zero Hedge appreciates the NYSE's efforts in bringing transparency to the high-frequency trading markets and in fixing flawed information. Granted, one would be tempted to inquire just what other reported data the specified "system error" may have rendered completely useless, and whether this "system error" was also pertinent in the unprecedented extension of last Thursday's trading session. However, Zero Hedge knows not to push its luck: however, we can hope that in due course, all relevant information will eventually surface. Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, July 5, 2009

Is A Case Of Quant Trading Sabotage About To Destroy Goldman Sachs?

Major developing story: Matt Goldstein over at Reuters may have just broken a story that could spell doom for if not the entire Goldman Sachs program trading group, then at least those who deal with "low latency (microseconds) event-driven market data processing, strategy, and order submissions." Visions of swirling, gray storm clouds over Goldman's SLP and hi-fi traders begin to form.

Back-up: This week's NYSE Program Trading report was very odd: not only because program trading hit 48.6% of all NYSE trading, a record high at least since the NYSE keep tabs of this data, and a data point which in itself was startling enough to cause some serious red flags as I jaunt from village to village in what little is left of Europe's bison country, but what was shocking was the disappearance of the #1 mainstay of complete trading domination (i.e., Goldman Sachs) from not just the aforementioned #1 spot, but the entire complete list. In other words: Goldman went from 1st to N/A in one week.



Even more odd, this "disappearance" comes hot on the heels of what Zero Hedge reported could be potentially a major change to the way the NYSE provides its weekly program trading report. Of course, Ray over at the NYSE immediately replied to Zero Hedge that all was going to be same as always ... Odd, maybe he meant that all is back to normal except the reporting of Goldman's trades. Either way, it might very well be time for proactive readers to again contact the two employees publicly disclosed by the NYSE as lead-contacts on the issue. Readers will recall that it was these same two who were previously steadfastly assuring anyone who would listen that there would be no change at all in data reporting.

Robert Airo, Senior Vice President, NYSE Euronext at (212) 656-5663 or
Aleksandra Radakovic, Vice President, NYSE Regulation at (212) 656-4144

Alas, the just released weekly data proves that either theirs was a material misrepresentation of facts, or Goldman simply suddenly decided to stop transacting with the NYSE, or, what would be even more sinister, Goldman notified the NYSE to scrap all their trading data from the prior week. Why would they do that?

Going back to Matt Goldstein's story. In a nutshell, on Friday, one Sergey Aleynikov was arrested at Newark airport by FBI agents, as he was coming back from a trip to Chicago (maybe visiting his new employer), on what are basically industrial espionage charges. Sergey, or Serge as his Linked-In account identifies him, was VP of equity strategy over at 85 Broad (or maybe 1 New York Plaza, his detailed Bloomberg Bio page has disappeared) had the following responsibilities at Goldman Sachs according to Linked-In:

• Lead development of a distributed real-time co-located high-frequency trading (HFT) platform.The main objective was to engineer a very low latency (microseconds) event-driven market data processing, strategy, and order submission engine. The system was obtaining multicast market data from Nasdaq, Arca/NYSE, CME and running trading algorithms with low latency requirements responsive to changes in market conditions.
• Implemented a real-time monitoring solution for the distributed trading system using a combination of technologies (SNMP, Erlang/OTP, boost, ACE, TibcoRV, real-time distributed replicated database, etc) to monitor load and health of trading processes in the mother-ship and co-located sites so that trading decisions can be prioritized based on congestion and queuing delays.
• Responsible for development of real-time market feed handlers, order processing engines and trading tools at a Quantitative Equity Trading revenue-making HFT desk.

If the allegations are true, it looks like Goldman's hi-fi quant trading desk was thoroughly penetrated by a "spy", and as readers will recall, Serge(y)'s description of his job duties mirrors what Mr. Ed Canaday conveniently provided to Zero Hedge as a description of Goldman's SLP program. (Sources connected with the office of the United States Attorney have confirmed to Zero Hedge that Aleynikov was at one time or another a Goldman employee.").

The plot thickens: per FBI agent Michael McSwain's sworn deposition, Sergey quit a firm described as "Financial Institution" in the affidavit, which according to circumstantial evidence and according to Goldstein is none other than Goldman Sachs, on June 5, at that time earning $400,000 annually. As Matt reports, he proceeded to move to a Chicago firm engaged in "high volume automated trading" where he would make 3x his $400k salary (Hey Getco, is it time for a formal release at least denying you guys had anything to do with this, cause if you did it might not look that hot. No matter, we have reached out to our sources in law enforcement to confirm or deny Getco's, and Goldman's, involvement: once we get a response we will immediately advise our readers).

In the 5 days immediately preceeding his departure from "Financial Institution" (potentially GS), Sergey allegedly downloaded 32 megs of ultra top-secret quant trading proprietary code, that, according to Special Agent McSwain's affidavit, he then proceeded to encrypt and upload to a website in Germany, with a UK owner. One can only imagine the value of this "code" not only to Goldman but to the highest bidder. After all, from the affidavit: "certain features of the [code], such as speed and efficiency by which it obtains and processes market data, gives the Financial Institution a competitive advantage among other firms that also engage in high-volume automated trading.The Financial Institution further believes that, if competing firms were to obtain the [code] and use its features, the Financial Institution's ability to profit from the [code]'s speed and efficiency would be significantly diminished." Needless to say, many others are now also likely hot on the trail of the code.

What is probably most notable, in less than a month since Sergey's departure from [Goldman?], the FBI was summoned to task and the alleged saboteur was arrested and promptly gagged: if anyone is amazed by the unprecedented speed of this investigative process, you are not alone. If only the FBI were to tackle cases of national security and loss of life with the same speed and precision as they confront presumed high-frequency program trading industrial espionage cases... especially those that allegedly involve Goldman Sachs.

Now the real question here is, does [GS?] feel lucky? Because the code has supposedly been in the hands of an outsider for over a month, one might suspect that anyone who wanted to has had ample opportunity - if the holder(s) wished to sell... Would that have anything to do with the even weirder than usual market action over the past 2-3 weeks: after all it is the very Goldman Sachs (which may or may not be the target of this program trading industrial espionage) which is the primary SLP on the world's biggest stock exchange.

Another major question: do Goldman and the NYSE not have a fiduciary responsibility to announce to both shareholders and any interested parties if there has been a major security breach in their trading operations? Certainly this seems like a material piece of information: given that program trading accounted for 49% of all NYSE trading last week, and Goldman as recently as one week ago represented about 60% of all principal program trading, will this be called an issue threatening the National Security of the United States. Shouldn't all market participants be aware that there is some rogue code in cyberspace that can be abused by the highest bidder, who very likely will not be interested in proving the efficient market hypothesis? What will happened when said bidder goes about trying to front run none other than the "Financial Institution" [GS]?

The complete affidavit can be downloaded from this post here, and is also provided Scribed below as this could (and likely should) become a matter of National Security. Zero Hedge will closely monitor this situation from the European hinterland and provide updates as they come. For really interested readers, we recommend tracking any potentially new developments on the forums and message boards over at Wilmott.


major hat tip Matt Goldstein of Reuters

Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, July 2, 2009

Goldman Sachs Responds To Zero Hedge

It seems quite a few individuals noticed our post attempting to justify some very peculiar language in not just a certain Goldman Sachs Internet disclaimer, but also the strange wording prominently featured in critical GS-client agreements. One happened to be Goldman Sachs itself. We take this opportunity to present the response by Goldman Sachs' spokesman Ed Canaday:
Dear Mr Durbin:

This is in response to your recent blog about our web site disclaimer. It is quite usual for websites to have disclaimers that refer to the monitoring of site usage. Most web sites, including yours we noticed, track usage by their visitors. This is primarily used for marketing and to help inform decision about enhancing content.

Your suggestion that we monitor our web site to facilitate front-running is untrue and offensive.

Sincerely

Ed Canaday
Vice President
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

____________________
Ed Canaday
Office: xxx-xxx-xxxx
Cell: xxx-xxx-xxxx
We are happy to have caught the attention of Mr. Canaday. We believe this is the start of a great ongoing dialog. In that vein, Marla has replied to Mr. Canaday and Goldman Sachs, attempting to elaborate on some of the point that Ed did not touch upon. I present it below and am looking forward for Goldman's forthcoming reponse:
Dear Mr. Canady:

Thanks for your quick reply.

For your future reference, the correct spelling for "Tyler" is "Tyler Durden." (A re-viewing of "Fight Club" might be in order, but I know Goldman VPs probably rarely have time for such luxuries).

Obviously, we want to make sure we have our facts correct so I am pleased to see your email. Perhaps you can lay to rest some questions we have for the record:

1. Indeed, data use disclaimers are a common feature on most websites. Still, I think you will agree that where usage patterns are so directly linked with potential investment activity and customer intentions it is a bit unusual not to have a more explicit description of the kind of use Goldman intends here. This is particularly so where customer attitudes are concerned, and appearances are important. "Internal business purposes" is a bit vague in this respect, don't you find? This seems unlike Goldman, usually a firm known for very careful attention to detail. Why is a more specific description of such purposes not included? I would think that easier than explaining the matter repeatedly to random bloggers (and customers).

2. I notice that you have not taken the opportunity to address similar disclaimer language in the form contracts used by Goldman and Spear, Leeds and Kellogg. Was this omission intentional or an oversight? (For your reference you can find the language we are curious about here: http://www.zerohedge.com/node/12083). "You acknowledge that we may monitor your use of the Services for our own purposes (and not for your benefit). We may use the resulting information for internal business purposes or in accordance with the rules of any applicable regulatory or self-regulatory body and in compliance with applicable law and regulation."

Not to be a stickler, but the drafting here seems quite careless.
Note the differing terms between the website disclaimer "...the resultant information may be used by GS for its internal business purposes OR in accordance with the rules of any applicable regulatory or self-regulatory organization...." (emphasis added) and the form disclaimer "...we may use the resulting information for internal business purposes or in accordance with the rules of any applicable regulatory or self-regulatory body AND in compliance with applicable law and regulation...." (emphasis added).

As a reformed legal professional myself, this seems a bit sloppy to me. Can you comment on the language and in particular why a more explicit definition of "internal business purposes" is not included?

3. I also notice that you do not specifically address our question:
"...has Goldman has ever actually used 360 submitted information in the decision making process of its prop trading desk?" Could you give us a response there? Perhaps you might augment that to include the decision making process of any Goldman investment decisions rather than just the prop desk and all information Goldman collects about 360 users.

And lastly, while we have your attention, we were hoping you could make a statement for Zero Hedge and its readers on the long discussed topic on our pages regarding Goldman Sachs' effective monopolization of Principal Program Trading in the New York Stock Exchange. In other venues you have attributed this domination solely to Goldman's selection as the one and only SLP currently used by the NYSE. Would you care to elaborate how that fits in with the NYSE's upcoming changes to their DPTR (http://www.zerohedge.com/node/11769)
specifically as pertaining to J and K account type indicators. Was Goldman in any way consulted in the making of this decision by the NYSE? Did Goldman have any direct communication with the SEC on this issue?

Thanks for your help with these matters. As an aside, if there is a contact at Goldman we can routinely direct these questions to that might be helpful for both of us going forward. I look forward to hearing from you.

Best Regards,

"Marla Singer"

Zero Hedge
Of course, as soon as we receive additional disclosure on this matter, we will post it promptly. Sphere: Related Content

Toxic Equity Trading Order Flow On Wall Street

Lots of readers interest yesterday following Joe Saluzzi's Bloomberg interview. I present a White Paper by Themis Trading in which Joe elaborates on many of the concepts that may have flown over the heads of some of the more "beginner" readers. Additionally, I recommend readers search for specific concepts within Zero Hedge - we have covered the topic of program trading and liquidity extensively here over the past 3 months.

Sphere: Related Content

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

NYSE Halts Transparency, Feels Goldman Program Trading Disclosure Is Unnecessary

In a move set to infuriate and send many Zero Hedge readers over the top, the NYSE has taken action to make sure that nobody will henceforth be able to keep track of the complete dominance that Goldman Sachs exerts over the New York Stock Exchange. This basically ends our weekly Program Trading updates disclosed every Thursday indicating that Goldman has singlehandedly captured all of NYSE's program trading.

In an information memorandum released on June 24 (09-31), the NYSE Regulation team has announced the Decommissioning of the Daily Program Trading Report (DPTR).

From the memo:
The New York Stock Exchange LLC (“NYSE”) will be decommissioning the requirement to report program trading activity via the Daily Program Trading Report (“DPTR”), which was previously approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”).1 The last trade date for which member organizations will be required to file the DPTR with the Exchange will be July 10, 2009 and therefore the last required date to submit the DPTR will be July 14, 2009.

In the 2007 rule filing, the Exchange proposed to eliminate DPTR. The 2007 filing noted that there was some duplication between the DPTR data and the audit trail information that member organizations provide to the Exchange via account-type indicators at the time that they submit program trades to the Exchange... [A]fter consulting with the SEC, the Exchange announced that it would delay implementation of the two redefined account type indicators, and pending such implementation, member organizations would be required to continue filing the DPTR with the Exchange. The current delayed implementation date of the redefined J and K account type indicators is June 30, 2009. Accordingly, the Exchange still requires member organizations to submit DPTR.

The Exchange has filed with the SEC to implement the decommissioning of the DPTRrequirement following the July 10, 2009 trade date. Accordingly, the last required submission of the DPTR will be on July 14, 2009, which is the second business day after the last trade date for which the DPTR is required.

In addition, in connection with the decommissioning of the DPTR, the Exchange will not be implementing the proposed redefined program trading account type indicators (J and K) and will continue to use the existing J and K audit trail account types. Upon further analysis and based on industry input, the Exchange has determined that these redefined account type indicators do not enhance the regulatory audit trail because the proposed redefined J and K could subsume some of the other, more granular account type indicators that the Exchange currently receives. Accordingly, the Exchange has determined not to redefine the J and K account types in the manner previously proposed, and is instead leaving the J and K account-type definitions unchanged.

The Exchange further notes that it will use the existing account type indicator data – which captures program trade information for those orders sent to and executed on the Exchange – to report to the Commission on a weekly basis the program trading statistics for portions of program trades executed on the Exchange. Accordingly, beginning on July 23, 2009, the Exchange will provide the Commission with its weekly statistics on program trading based on account type indicator data rather than DPTR data. Similarly, at the same time, the weekly statistics regarding program trades that the Exchange provides to media outlets will also be derived from account type indicator data rather than the DPTR.
Basically this is the beginning of the end of unmodified data transparency. Going forward the NYSE will provide whatever data it feels comfortable, after sufficient internal "audits," and media outlets such as Zero Hedge, which had presented its millions of readers the only data point about Goldman's complete encroachment of not only NYSE but Program Trading, will be henceforth unreliable and likely will present no useful information at all.

This is a travesty, as well as a complete obliteration and a mockery of the move for transparency that the Administration, Regulators and Exchanges have been posturing they support.

We advise all readers to contact the provided staff on the memorandum and voice your incredulity with this brazen move to completely obfuscate Goldman's behind-the-scenes take over the world's biggest stock exchange.
Robert Airo, Senior Vice President, NYSE Euronext at (212) 656-5663 or
Aleksandra Radakovic, Vice President, NYSE Regulation at (212) 656-4144




hat tip Greg Sphere: Related Content

Friday, June 26, 2009

Goldman Sachs Principal Transactions Update: Back With A Vengeance

Just released NYSE data indicate a 50% ramp up by Goldman's principal Program Trading unit. Whereas the prior week saw Goldman trading only 631 million principal shares on the NYSE, the most recent data indicate a massive rise to 977.8 million. Also notable is Credit Suisse's doubling in principal program trades to 586 million from 245 million. Zero Hedge is compiling materials to demonstrate the phenomenal gamble CS is taking by being the largest holder of the ETF-underlying pair trade. The ensuing implosion, once the market loses the invisible futures bid, will likely destroy Switzerland's second biggest bank and likely take down the country with it.

Probably most notable is the screaming increase in overall program trading, from 30.7% of all NYSE volume to 40.4%! Virtually every broker saw their Principal PT operations double week over week: seems like everyone is brokering those ETF trades now. Poor SPY and IWM are being mangled 10 ways from Sunday nowadays.



Source: NYSE
Sphere: Related Content

Friday, June 19, 2009

Goldman Sachs Principal Transactions Update: 631 Million Shares

Latest NYSE Program Trading data out. Program Trading volume continues to decline, with 3.4 billion shares traded, down 700 million from the week before. Most notable is Goldman's dramatic drop in principal trading, down from on average 1 billion over the past 2 months to a mere 631 million. In the meantime, Credit Suisse is continuing its climb in Principal PT. As Zero Hedge will discuss over the next few days, CS may have positioned itself as one of the biggest principal holders of the single name - ETF basis trade, with, by some estimates, over $20 billion in net exposure. If true, that would make Boaz Weinstein's blow up in the CDS basis trade seems like child's play when the ETF trade reverts and CS is forced to run to the SNB for yet another bailout.

Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Observations On High Frequency Trading

Joe Saluzzi of Themis Trading has put together a great synopsis of a High Frequency Trading roundtable held today, called, in traditional HFT egomaniacal fashion, “High Frequency Trading: The New World Order.” Useful insight for many, who have been increasingly inquiring about the topic on Zero Hedge. Joe's conclusions is worth highlighting:
Our equity market is being controlled by machines that are nothing more than two bit, SOES bandits. They cloak themselves under the mantra of liquidity providers but they are really just locusts and are feeding off the equity market until it doesn’t suit them anymore. Once their profit margins are squeezed to almost zero, they are likely just to move on to a new market. But what damage would they have done? We will be left with a shell of a market that is used to being led around by computers. Real people and real capital are a scarce resource in today’s market.
Goldman is all too familiar with providing HFT (and otherwise) liquidity... and locusts. Sphere: Related Content

Friday, May 29, 2009

Goldman Sachs Principal Transactions Update: Collapse In Agency Program Trading Volume

In the week ended May 22, NYSE program trading dropped to a statistically significant low of 2.9 billion shares, down from 3.3 billion the week before, and from a 3.8 billion prior 52 week average. As for specific actors, no surprise, Goldman leading the government's SLP team with a 7:1 ratio of principal to facilitation/agency.



As for today's market close, with a literally parabolic jump in the last minute of trading, if anyone still thinks this market trades based on anything resembling normal behavior (unless someone had a very Jerome Kerviel-esque fat delta hedging finger or one/two moderate/large quants who had a huge index hedge imploded), I have some BBB+ rated CMBS to sell to you at par. One culprit could be hiding in the huge drop of agency trading, which this week dropped to a several month low of 1.875 billion shares.



So as essentially no institutional or retail clients are trading any more, it is just a few desperate computers trying to front run each other. And, of course, for the biggest beneficiary of this PT principal bonanza, look no further than the chart below.



Going back to today's ridiculous close, the chart below shows it all: the complete tape painting volume spike at the very end of the day speaks for itself. And as computers now simply issue forced stock recall orders to each other, painting the tape wet with manipulative intent and volume spikes into the last 20 minutes of trading every day, their human creators are left on the sidelines, trying to outshout each other as to the reason for why the market keeps rising while the economy keeps tumbling.



Is there ever going to be any transparency in this market again? Sphere: Related Content