Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

The Chinese Stock Bubble: Watch For "Critical Level Around July 17-27, 2009"

Expanding on Cornelius' early piece on China, here is an analysis out of some BNP quants who for one reason or another are convinced the end's in sight. For those who are forgot where they put their Ritalin, here is the punchline:

"By the very nature of the model, this result gives us two conclusions. Firstly, there exists a bubble in the Shanghai Composite Index. Secondly, it will reach a critical level around July 17-27, 2009. This will lead to a change in regime which may be a crash or a more gently bubble deflation. An extended version of this note, with a careful assessment of the confidence intervals and comparisons with the previous Chinese bubble ending in Oct. 2007, will be released soon."


h/t Jeff

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Monday, July 13, 2009

Continued Commentary On The China Commodities Bubble

Despite the numerous anecdotes of disbelieving analysts on Chinese demand, the commodities just keep rolling in to Chinese harbors. Indeed, here at ZH HQ we have been pounding this drum for a while and have had some great guest pieces recently on the topic. The latest article discusses all the long lines in offloading ships while insiders marvel at the lack of exports to drive this seemingly phantom demand. The following quote serves as a great analogy for the Chinese economy as a whole:

“The level of [iron ore] importing doesn't match the level of steel production so far this year, so there's a considerable amount of stockpiling going on,” said Tim Huxley, chief executive of Hong Kong-based Wah Kwong Maritime Transport Holdings, who along with many others in the shipping industry is grateful for what he called “a shot in the arm” but skeptical that the stockpiling can continue – especially since many of those container ships are sent away empty, without export orders to fill them.

To continue the analogy, these "empty containers" are in fact being filled with government stimulus from the Chinese government. None of this is really new, especially to frequent readers of this blog. However, this is a good juncture to look at the drivers and the implications.

- the Chinese government pumping stimulus money into the economy in a directed way (i.e. buying commodities)

This one is very tricky. Unlike other governments' stimulus packages, the Chinese have the capacity to be much more discrete (e.g. state owned corporations, government rebates for cars for unspecified amounts, etc.) leading to a general uncertainty about where the stimulus line ends and market driven demand begins. Especially with political unrest tied to > 8% annual growth, there is a lot to chew on here. Any clear news on this front should be greatly appreciated i.e. China announces an expansion of the original stimulus package.

- the Chinese government diversifying its assets away from exposure to the dollar

We have never really bought this argument because of the relative sizes involved. However, it's worth mentioning simply because of the market psychology entangled in there. We won't know the truth on this one until it's too late anyway but a good indicator would be the SHFE-LME spread.

- the global demand picture

This one is likely to be bearish for any significant time frame involved. With the US consumer moving to a permanently higher level of savings and the other consumption subtitutes hurting with problems of their own, this cannot really be counted on to push commodities for a couple of years (save the occasional June/July run up in oil prices).

- existing stockpiles

At this point, it's pretty clear the Chinese have enough stockpiled to not have this be a serious influence on the supply/demand picture. Of course, this assumes "free markets" and the resultant appropriate demand fundamentals and not that the Chinese are crunching away on iron ore to build bridges to nowhere. There are a lot of things out there masquerading as "stockpile drivers" but the reality is relatively clear.

Ultimately, this battle is going to be won on technicals - painfully obvious, yes but necessary to reiterate for all the China bears who are glued to every news release on electricity output and car sales. There are very few potential fundamental announcements that can prick this bubble and the slow simmer ones have already been bubbling for a while with no effect. As speculators, this one has the potential to salvage many of the wounded and bloodied accounts out there. When the move happens, it will be without warning and it will be swift.

Hat tip to Anton for the article

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Monday, June 29, 2009

Guest Post: China And Brazil

Submitted by Nemo of Nemo's Blog

I'm reading two books right now, which I will deal with in two posts. The first is The Forgotten Continent by Michael Reid, the former bureau Chief for Latam at The Economist about modern Latin American history and development.

Firstly, to all the Sinologists and policy analysts does this sound at all familiar?
"In addition to raising tariffs on imports, governments added many non-tariff barriers (such as outright prohibitions) against goods which competed with local production, and gave soft loans and subsidies to favored industrial firms. They also used the state aggressively to promote development, through state-owned companies and regulation, and to try to spread its benefits around. This effort was partly successful: economic growth was fairly brisk..... But the cost was heavy. Because they were over-protected, many industrial firms were very inefficient."
Wow, this could be China today - soft loans, SOEs, protected industries and informal trade barriers. Well where did all that wasted capital and loan printing go I wonder?
"Given the ideal external conditions, growth.. remained relatively disappointing [in the late 70s to the 90s]- especially when measured against growth rates in China and India. That comparison was in part unfair: China is at a similar stage in its development to that of Brazil from the 1950s to the 1970s, Of industrialization based on drawing in the reserve army of rural labour and foreign capital."
Which gets to an important point: most of China's productivity gains are based off the back of moving people out of subsistence labor to the cities where they work in the private and relatively efficient export sector. Once this party is over, and, indeed, by some accounts it was before the recession hit, the real test of China's economic model will come to the fore. If they get it wrong and fail to do the kind of microeconomic reform then should know what to expect:
"Inflation, chronically higher... than elsewhere, took off. Devaluation increased the price of imports. Budget-cutting was offset by recession, which cut tax revenues, leading many governments to print money on an unprecedented scale...High inflation acts as a tax on the poor: the better off normally secure some degree of protection against the declining value of money through wage indexation, buying dollars or holding assets.... High and rising inflation destroys the possibility of financial planning, or of agreeing long-term contracts. It triggers social conflicts, undermines trust in government and so tends to lead to political instability."
A unruly poor in China? I don't think anyone wants that. The problem is that without SOE, banking and other key reforms that were outlined in the Washington consensus China can expect little better in the long run.

The important difference is that unlike Latin America China pursued the Asian export promotion model rather than the import substitution model, giving them hard currency (quite a lot of it right now) and as a result, room to move rather than being a victim of commodity price volatility and the effects that has on their foreign exchange rates and balance of payments position outlined well in Michael Pettis' book The Volatility Machine. The problems remain much the same however - room to move does not entitle you to sit around and wait for things to happen. To borrow from my chosen past time, Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, its a little like being choked: a strong neck will buy you time but won't solve your long term issue of someone getting closer and closer to cutting off the blood flow to your head.

The World Bank's quarterly report has picked up on the key story here:
"Growth in China should remain respectable this year and next, although it is too early to say there is a sustained recovery. Government influenced investment will strongly support growth in 2009. Nonetheless, there are limits to how much and how long China’s growth can diverge from global growth based on government influenced spending, given that China’s real economy is relatively integrated in the world economy."
Lets all hope China comes to grips with the challenge ahead of them sooner rather than later, because as I'll explain in my next post this carbon tariff line of thinking is gaining serious currency and is probably coming down the pike sooner rather than later for China.

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Sunday, June 21, 2009

Guest Post: China - Economic Catastrophe Unfolding

Submitted by Terence Doherty, guest author (via Phil's Stock World)

Here’s some recent news about the real estate markets in China. I think it is fascinating watching how these things unfold. This proves once again that the lesson of history is that we don’t learn the lessons of history.

I predicted over 2 years ago that the Chinese stock markets would implode dramatically, much to everybody’s disbelief and skepticism. It began a few months sooner than I thought, but, that is exactly what has happened. Now for the last year or so, I have predicted that things will get VERY bad in the Chinese real estate markets over the next several years. Again, most people I have talked to about this (especially Chinese) have almost universally dismissed this notion as absurd.

But this is not just a guess. When you read these articles, you will see just some of the evidence that leads me to this conclusion. There are a lot of data on this, and most of it comes from statistics issued by various Chinese government agencies. But it is not advertised by the mainland press or TV. So, many Chinese are not at all aware, and think that everything will soon be wonderful, because that is pretty much what they constantly hear from the official media.

That is one thing I noticed immediately about China: there is a constant barrage everywhere you turn—-TV, advertisements, magazines, newspapers, billboards, etc.—-that essentially suggests that everything is wonderful and getting more wonderful all the time, and everybody is just happy, happy, happy, and China is getting better and better and stronger and stronger. I was really struck by this. It was like living in a never-ending infomercial. Maybe some go to China and are not very aware of this, but to me it was like a constant din.

Actually, at least some of this data is readily available on the mainland. But it requires digging. The official news agencies like Xinhua and the People’s Daily just keep repeating the same mindless mantra in endlessly varying ways every day: “Everything is good, there are only a few small little problems, but the Motherland is unstoppable and will just get mightier and mightier and mightier.” If the Falun Gong would just chant that mantra, they would get to keep their organs and they would have no more problems in China.

http://mpettis.com/2009/02/chinese-real-estate-is-in-the-headlines-again/

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a36b342-280e-11de-8dbf-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

The news here is actually worse than I realized. One very alarming thing is that the Chinese banks have avoided writing down bad debt. I should have assumed this would happen, since it is hard to see how it could be avoided, given the nature of the Chinese culture. This is NOT a good idea. It is like pretending that defaults and bad debt simply don’t exist, and this is very bad for the financial sector in the long run.

This is exactly what the Japanese banks have done, and it is partly because of this that their stock markets have imploded over the last 20 years, and their economy has been stagnant for many years—-the Nikkei collapsed in late 1989 after peaking at about 39,000. Now, a full 20 years later, it is only trading at around 8800, and would have to rise another 450% just to equal the old highs, and that would not even consider the effects of the reduced buying power of the yen today vs. 1989. When you take that and inflation into consideration, the Nikkei would probably have to rise more like 700% or 800% or more from current levels to equal the equivalent of 1989 values. This is actually not very atypical for an imploded bubble. And that is exactly what the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are looking at, since you have the exact same lethal combination in 1989 Japan as you do now in China: dual bubbles in real estate and stocks (one has imploded), and a decided reluctance to face facts and write down bad debt and defaults. In contrast, in the US in March 2000, we had a bubble in the stock market but not the real estate sector. And even though 7 trillion dollars in stock equity disappeared after March 2000, there was an increase in value of the real estate markets of 8 trillion dollars that more than offset those losses. That is a major factor that allowed the economy to expand in subsequent years, but that is not possible in China, just as it was not possible in 1989 Japan.

This is a singularly ominous combination that makes China’s economic future outlook over the next 25 years very grim. And that, in turn, will lead to acceleration of civil unrest. In fact, that has already happened: incidents of violent civil unrest have accelerated markedly all across China over the past year or two. But I think this could well get far more noticeable and disruptive. Some economists have said that in order to avoid disruptive amounts of civil unrest (as opposed to the more manageable baseline levels of unrest that are a constant), China’s economy must grow by 8.5% per year or more, just to keep enough people quiet. I suspect that is probably more or less approximately true in principle, although I don’t know where they came up with that number. But regardless of what that magic number might be, when that economy gets really bad—–watch out. That’s the seeds of civil war, if you ask me. If you have a very large group of desperate people coupled with an extreme polarization of wealth, you have a classic “haves” vs. “have nots” Marxian confrontation that is the underpinning of most if not all major revolutions. Then, the only missing ingredient is a charismatic leader (like Mao, for example…..).

Eventually, debt must be written down, otherwise confidence in the banking sector will be insufficient to promote liquidity, and if you cannot promote liquidity and credit markets, you can not stimulate economic recovery. And that is the story of Japan over the last 20 years. That is what has been happening here in the US over the last year or two, but this is getting better here because banks and other financial institutions have been booking their losses (mostly because the government forced them to do this when they gave them the stimulus money). So why do banks resist writing down bad debt? Because in the short term, it makes them look like failures, and people in positions of power are afraid they will lose their jobs. So, to keep their jobs and to “save face,” (NEVER underestimate the critical importance of “face” in Asian cultures!), they just keep pretending everything is wonderful. The problem is they keep their jobs and look like they are very clever, but that just makes things worse and worse, and eventually causes the economy to just stagnate and go nowhere. Just ask the Japanese…….

Anyway,….. no matter what people may tell you, this is the worst possible time to buy real estate in China in particular, or to invest in China in general. Read these and you will see why.

http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/india-and-china-housing-markets-on-the-bubble-51539.aspx

http://housingdoom.com/2009/02/27/op-ed-friday-chinas-commercial-real-estate-bubble-bursting

Look at this one - http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/01/09/with-fears-of-a-real-estate-bubble-growing-china-looks-to-throttle-back-foreign-investments-in-development-projects/, dated January 9, 2008…..

They talk about a book that was “just published” by some hedge fund whiz by the name of Rogers who lives in China now. The book is about as bullish as you can get on China. He says that “even if China’s stock market were to plummet, that country’s economy would remain healthy, and would continue to advance unchecked.” He calls China “the world’s greatest market.”

I don’t know if this is a pump-and-dump scheme, but it sure sounds like one to me. Somebody ought to inform Mr. Rogers that even as his book was being published, the Shanghai and Shenzhen bubbles had already burst, had plummeted 15% in a few months, and were destined to drop far more over the remainder of 2008. And despite the fact that these bubbles lost over 70% in a year, they have NOT seen the bottom yet. And, they won’t see those lofty 6000+ levels again in real dollar (or real RMB) terms for another 30 years at least.

If you ask me, there’s no better short in the world than China. The problem is that the vehicles for shorting anything in China are very limited and not ideal. Well-heeled investors in China can short those markets, but this is a relatively recent development (maybe 2 years ago they changed the regulations). The average retail investor in China still can not short anything in those markets, because there are very stiff capital maintenance requirements with brokers there. And, the average retail investor elsewhere has only a couple of choices.
So how to make money in China?

I think you could make a lot of money in China in two rather obvious ways:

Short-sell the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock indexes (there are ways to do that here in the US, albeit not ideal ways)
Short-sell the Chinese real estate market (not sure how you can do that).

Here’s a very recent piece on a report just released by Albert Edwards and Societe Generale. Edwards correctly called the 1997 bubble in Asia. They are now predicting new lows will be reached in Asian markets in the second half of 2009. He is dead on with this quote: “The continued enthusiasm for all things China reminds me so much of the way investors were almost totally blind to the fact the US growth miracle was build on sand. China could be the biggest disappointment yet.”

[See: Soc Gen: "Expect New Equity Lows In H2", China Is The Global Achilles Heel, Zero Hedge].

I would only add that, in my view, there is no doubt: China will be the biggest disappointment yet. That economy will display in historically unprecedented graphic detail exactly how much devastation bubbles can cause, ESPECIALLY simultaneous bubbles. China reminds me of a place near where I live called “The Wedge.” It is a famous place for body surfing and belly-boarding, and just as famous (or infamous) for the steady toll of injuries and deaths the place produces. The waves come from the northwest, bounce off the jetty, then head back into the path of incoming waves. Two waves meet and potentiate one another, and rise to peak in a “wedge” shape that often has unbelievably ferocious power. And, because these waves break very close to shore in shallow water, there have been quite a lot of people who went “over the top” and were jackhammered into the sand and rendered paraplegic or quadriplegic there, or killed outright. You’d never believe the ferocity of this place unless you have been there and seen it with your own eyes and ears (it is LOUD). Crowds gather on the sand on big days just to gaze in awe (and watch the inevitable carnage). People don’t simply get “rag-dolled” here when they don’t make the wave, they can get flat pulverized into the sand.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNH4lK6FArA&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqbWnmENCng&feature=related

The WEDGE - Huge Surf / April 11, 2007

Well, I think you’ve got the equivalent in China, because both real estate and equity markets have formed frightening bubbles. And, just to add to things, an increasing proportion of both commercial and residential real estate lies vacant, building continues nonetheless, the banking sector’s fortunes are strongly tied to the construction and real estate markets, there is virtually no secondary market for real estate to speak of, and Chinese banks are notoriously reluctant to write down bad debt. Sounds to me a lot like Japan in the late 80s—only worse. The Nikkei even today is trading about 75% below where it was trading at the peak in late 1989. And that doesn’t even consider the change in buying power of the yen over that time. This is a devastating loss that takes at least a full generation to repair.

I think China will recapitulate what happened in Japan, and for all the same reasons. You’ve got precisely the same prerequisites for disaster in China, so why would it be any different this time? Plus, there are some additional reasons why things will be particularly bad there over then next 25 or 30 years. One thing we have learned about bubbles—-once they are fully formed, there is no way to tame them, just like a fully-formed wave at the Wedge when it’s really firing. They just have to expend their explosive energy, and anybody with the common sense God gave gravel will just get out of the way. There is no way to suppress or regulate these things once they begin to gather momentum. No government or regulatory body has ever succeeded in doing so, to the best of my knowledge, and few if any have any motivation to even try. Why would anybody mess with a cash cow that is driving an economy at breakneck speed, after all?

We have not seen the full force of the implosion yet. That is still probably months away. In the meantime, the bull trap sucker’s rally that the Chinese stock market have been in for several months now rather predictably out-suckers even the US sucker’s rally. The Shanghai market is up almost 70% from the lows in November. That one has gone about as far as it can go now, and is really gonna crash and burn.

Here’s a very interesting story published a few weeks ago in the Far Eastern Economic Review on the real estate markets in China. You will see that the gist of this is that a huge proportion of real estate bought in China lies empty. The reasons are not completely understood, but it is not simply a matter of a huge supply/demand imbalance (although that is certainly the case). Beyond that, there are more ominous undertones with potential repercussions that are very bad.

http://www.feer.com/economics/2009/june53/Chinas-Real-Estate-Riddle


It seems that many Chinese buy real estate because they view it as a “can’t lose” investment (sound familiar?). They don’t often rent out the space. It is not as easy to rent residential space in China, because anybody who can would rather buy a new house, partly because of the prestige value, but also partly because they believe that real estate is a “can’t lose” investment. Evidently they have the belief that at some point in the future, they could always sell the property, since it is still technically “new.” Remember, there is at best only a very small secondary market in real estate in China. Nobody in China goes shopping for a “used” home, they always look for a home in brand new developments. These are typically high rise apartment buildings that are really not very attractive at all by our standards (with some exceptions in parts of Beijing and some of the other largest cities). They often look more like tenement slums, particularly after they age a few years, because nobody does much painting or landscaping in Chinese residential areas. I have never seen housing tracts like the ones that are so common in the US, and I suppose they exist somewhere to a very limited extent, but I never even saw any single-family free-standing homes. It’s all high rise condo/apartment buildings. I realize this is kind of paradoxical…..that Chinese would believe they can always make money selling a home second-hand despite the fact that the secondary market is small or even nonexistent in places. But, that’s China. I think they are less concerned with actually realizing a gain, than in maintaining a paper gain. Again, a not insignificant factor here is the prestige value.

Anyhow, obviously this attitude among Chinese has only made things worse, because it has kept a doomed real estate market hovering and even pushing higher artificially. The demand for living space has not kept this market up, just the demand for real estate as a place to park cash. But builders don’t care, they just keep building anyway. Now, this will lead to disaster, partly for the same reason that disaster struck the stock markets there: investors who were once convinced that the Chinese stock market was a get-rich-quick machine lost confidence as they lost money, and that started the implosion in that market. Now, something like 30% of residential real estate in the big cities at least is unoccupied. What might happen to that real estate when the value of new residential real estate begins to plummet? What would YOU do if you owned a residence in Beijing, and suddenly discovered that brand new housing of comparable size/location could be bought for much less than what you paid for yours? How long would you hold on to it? How long would you continue to pay the mortgage?

I think you’ll see people walking away from mortgages, just like you do everywhere else, except the scale will be massively increased because much of the property is unoccupied, and cannot be sold very easily, except perhaps at a deep discount. And, as properties pile up on bank asset sheets, what will they do with them in a country that doesn’t have much of a secondary market and has far worse unemployment than we do? They can’t even sell them at fire-sale prices to any significant degree.

I don’t know how much Chinese banks gorged themselves on the CDO feeding frenzy that brought down the US banking sector. But even if they refrained somehow, they have a problem that might be just as bad: a ton of housing that will end up on their books, and no way to get rid of most of it. That could lead to eventually booking nearly total losses, which virtually never occurs in the US. And, just as occurred in Japan, they will pretend as long as they can that these losses don’t exist, but it is only a question of time until they are forced to face facts. Knowing a thing or two about China and Chinese, I bet Chinese banks will label the real estate that ends up on their books as “assets” and will value them at full value, as if the mortgage were still being paid and would eventually be paid in full. They would probably want to just downgrade the stated interest rate on the mortgage to zero, but the problem there is that with mortgages in China, there are big down payments (typically at least 25%), and the terms of the mortgages are usually rather short (typically 10 years). So, most mortgages require paying more on the principal from the beginning. That makes it much harder for a bank to pretend that no loss has occurred. They’ll figure out some way to rig the books. Chinese expertise at lying with numbers is well-established and among the best (or worst, depending on whether you value the truth or not). In fact, it is long-established unwritten government policy to produce absurdly optimistic statistics. But the end result will only be postponed somewhat. And people will remain fooled longer than they otherwise would have.

Anyhow, I think this is all pretty much inevitable. Chinese will predictably lose confidence in real estate as a “cash-equivalent” commodity or hedge against inflation. They will look to park their assets in whatever other safe havens they think there are, such as gold, US treasuries, etc. They certainly won’t pour money into the stock markets. They will walk away from mortgages en masse, and scramble to try to sell real estate holdings at a loss, probably with very limited luck. There won’t be a lot of buyers lining up to buy discounted residences in a deteriorating real estate market, with unemployment rising and corporate profits sinking and business going under and exports dropping (all of this has been steadily developing or is well underway).

This might seem rather gloomy, but I really can’t see much of anything optimistic in China’s future over the next several decades. Quite the opposite, you have been hard-pressed to have scripted a better economic doomsday scenario if you tried.
Trade

Besides the fact that corporate profits in China are down 30% this year, there is another series of widely underappreciated statistics: trade.

China’s economy is heavily dependent on exports of cheap goods. For one thing, this approach is unsustainable and does not of itself lead to economic strength. That’s why many cheap labor countries that similarly produce a lot of cheap, low-tech items do not thrive (e.g., Thailand, Honduras, Vietnam, etc.). In fact, they merely wallow in poverty that they can’t seem to get out of. Don’t forget, despite a wealthy class in the big cities in China, there is really no middle class, and the average wage in the countryside is often less than $100 per year. Even in the cities, the equivalent of the working class there typically makes around 1000 to 2000 RMB per month (roughly $145 to $290 US per month). But the vast majority of Chinese live in the countryside, which is another world compared to Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing, which house just a small fraction of China’s population. Imagining that these cities typify China is like standing on the Strip in Las Vegas and imagining that this is just a typical road in a a typical American town. So, China is classified as an emerging/developing economy by the World Bank.

We know one thing about recessions and depressions: economies that depend the most on exports are the ones that suffer the most. And without question, of all the major exporting countries in the world, China’s economy is the most heavily dependent on exports, mostly consisting of cheap goods.

So what has happened to China’s exports?

Well—notwithstanding a never-ending stream of perennially wrong predictions for over 6 months that things are turning around and recovery is imminent—there’s no good news no matter where you look. The rosiest statistics involve those denominated in dollars, but that markedly underestimates the real RMB-linked economic impact. But what do these statistics show?

In November, exports dropped in China for the first time in 7 years. In December, the drop was even steeper, and exports have dropped every single month thereafter. In May, exports dropped over 26% compared to the same month last year, which was the greatest drop that economy has ever experienced. Worse, exports to the European Union (China’s biggest foreign market) plunged 41.3% in May.

Inexplicably however, many analysts (especially in China, unsurprisingly) insist the worst of the slump is over, despite little or no tangible evidence to support that conclusion. But this has been a constant theme since November: every month, government (and other) spokesmen in China assert that things would quickly improve. For example, after exports fell 22.6% in April (which was a record, until the following month), Commerce Ministry spokesman Yao Jian said that China was confident exports would imporve “on the basis of the gradual recovery seen in the first quarter.” Gradual recovery? You call plunging exports, with each month exceeding the previous month, “gradual recovery?”

Even the Wall Street Journal got suckered into this lunacy. After exports dropped 17.1% in March and then 22.6% in April (both figures exceeded estimates, by the way), the WSJ cited increasing investment statistics, and said “The investment data reflect how Beijing’s stimulus program, which is focused on public infrastructure investments backed by a flood of bank credit, has helped stabilize the economy.”

I am not sure what “flood of bank credit” they are referring to. Actually, cheap credit by Chinese banks is drying up rapidly, which is not the least surprising, given the economic reality. In fact, in April, lending by Chinese banks dropped two-thirds compared to March.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c7ded3a2-3e4c-11de-9a6c-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

One of the reasons the government is putting the brakes on lending is because there is widespread suspicion that as much as one-third of the new loans during the first quarter were going into the stock market, not fixed investments. Could that be why the Shanghai market is up 54% so far this year, despite nothing but economic news moving from bad to really bad, and corporate profits down 30%?

The upshot is that while inflation has plagued China for years, now they have a new and far more ominous economic foe: DEFLATION. Not many seem to have noticed, but as of May, the Chinese economy had experienced FOUR straight months of deflation.

What was the response? Here’s an example, which is pretty much the same sort of tone we have seen all along in response to increasingly bad economic conditions in China:

"’Although the indices continued to see negative growth in April, deflationary concerns appear to be subsiding as the economy shows signs of recovery,’ said Jing Ulrich, chairman of China equities at JPMorgan.” China Economic Net

WHAT signs of recovery, other the continuous drone of optimistic pronouncements from analysts and government officials?

A month later, when “signs of recovery” once again failed to materialize, but instead were replaced with another month of plunging exports and deflation, Forbes gave this laughable pronouncement:

“China’s consumer prices continued to fall as expected in May, but analysts expect a price rebound by the end of this year. Meanwhile, the deflation could be a boon for consumers as China weathers a slowdown of wage growth.”

Well, I suppose wage growth is only a concern for that rapidly shrinking proportion of Chinese who actually have jobs. You think unemployment is bad here, well we are living the high life compared to China.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103149269


In Beijing, they threw out most of the peasants who migrated to the cities looking for work and ended up building the Olympic facilities. Now, the huge numbers of Chinese peasants that flocked to the cities (which was, by the way, the largest migration of human beings in the history of the world) have gone back to their farms, but they are mostly not needed there, either. 23 million migrant workers can’t find a job in the cities, and they can’t find work back home. University graduates spend years looking for work, and often end up selling clothes or working in one of the omnipresent KFCs. China’s answer? Well, according to the China Post, they want to train people to be housekeepers! Right. THAT oughta turn China into an economic powerhouse!

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/national-news/2009/06/20/213032/China-to.htm


For some reason, everybody seems intent on putting lipstick on this pig and calling it a Playboy bunny. Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Soc Gen: "Expect New Equity Lows In H2", China Is The Global Achilles Heel

Just released, a new and highly relevant Weekly Strategy report out from Albert Edwards of Societe Generale. Not only does Edwards, who was previously vilified then praised for calling the 1997 Asian Bubble, see a significant drop in equities before the end of the year, his main concern is every optimist's greatest green shoot: China.
Most areas in the markets have now discounted a V-shaped recovery. Any doubt will trigger a rapid reversal in prices. I continue to be extremely sceptical and see recent events as part of a 1930s-like, long march to revulsion. Talking about long marches, nowhere in the world fills me with more scepticism than the Chinese economic recovery. The continued enthusiasm for all things China reminds me so much of the way investors were almost totally blind to the fact the US growth miracle was built on sand. China could be the biggest disappointment yet.
Edwards follows up with some very amusing observations on mass delusions:
It is amazing how easily group-think takes a vice-like hold in the financial markets. As the BRIC economies meet for their debut summit, few dare to speak out against the new, ‘New Paradigm’. We also saw this same investor mania 13 years ago with the Asian Bubble, which the consensus thought was a growth miracle. But to go that far against the consensus invites a deluge of hate mail. That is why I keep a copy of a World Bank book entitled Thailand’s Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment and Sustained Growth It was published in October 1996, less than a year before Thailand’s (and Asia’s) economic collapse. It is all too easy for investors to buy into beguiling ‘growth’ stories which are in fact utter nonsense. If the bubble of belief in China’s medium-term growth prospects finally bursts it will have huge investment implications. I will be writing far more about this subject over this summer. But one thought, if China is doing so well how come Chinese company profits in the year to April are down some 30% yoy (see chart)?

SG have an excellent Asian economist, Glenn Maguire, who, unlike me, has been totally right about the recovery in the Chinese data this year (e.g. for example his Asian Economic Scrapbook – link). But it was notable that when the 6.1% yoy rise in Q1 GDP was published he said the real outturn was actually more like 3.5% yoy, but that the authorities “smooth” the data at turning points. Let me put that into plain English. The Q1 6.1% GDP outturn is simply a lie - and it helps explain why the Chinese data is derided by so many economic commentators. Many have highlighted that the GDP seems inconsistent with other data such as electricity output. This latter series remains weak. In May it declined 3.2% yoy and by 3% on the smoothed basis.

Yet few dare to point out that the emperor’s clothes might be absent. When, for example, the International Energy Agency had the temerity, a few weeks back, to suggest that the Chinese authorities were inflating the data (link), they were met with a robust broadside from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The NBS said on its website "“It is regrettable that the point of view in the original article is groundless…...We believe that, for an international organization, this approach lacks seriousness”"– link. I think this is a case of me thinks thou doth protest too much. Nevertheless, an article on Radio Free Asia reported that The National People’s Congress had found “serious fabrication” in official statistics – link and link.
The China doomsday scenario is nothing new, although mocking Edwards would be deja vu (and reckless) based on his prior correct prognostications. Furthermore, it is in both the US and China's interest to perpetuate the con game that everything in either country is fine. Yet the truth is that the economies of both countries are accelerating their deterioration, yet the respective governments, in an attempt to hold the wool over everybody's eyes, will be unable to do anything to really address the issue, until in tried and true fashion, it is much too late.

Instead of feigning concern over declining 401(k)'s and the lack of Joe Sixpack's latest credit fueled Plasma TV spending spree, our President should address every single weakness that America is suffering from, highlight it, and provide realistic alternatives to fix it, instead of betting the farm on increased leverage and speculative second derivatives of hope. The same goes double for our biggest creditor, although both imploding at the same time due to a disconnect between reality and perception, would have a poetic symmetry to it.

hat tip Oso Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Is there a bubble forming in copper?

Well, this just gets deeper and deeper. Before we proceed with the rest of the article, it's important to note that there currently isn't really a significant amount of room for copper to fall. However, as we dig through the details an inconsistent picture emerges.

DEMAND

As we mentioned in our first article on the subject, we discussed an uneasy feeling that demand was sure to fall in aggregate and copper prices did not seem to have that priced in. Supporting that view, BarCap reports that the mood at CESCO 2009 was relatively skeptical on the direction of the market and many were questioning if the market was reflecting the fundamentals. The consensus expectations were predicting a roughly 10% drop in demand with some going as high as 13.5%. As we would expect, most of this is coming from developed/industrialized countries. Put another way - in 2006, the ratio of OECD:China:ROW Cu demand was in roughly a 2:1:1 ratio. By 2009, this ratio is closer to 1.2:1.1:1.0, with overall demand numbers largely unchanged.


















Of course, no surprise here. However, with OECD plummeting and no real respite in sight for their economies and ROW being relatively stable - the question on demand becomes how much can we rely on China to keep importing huge amounts of copper.

Through our research, four major reasons have emerged to sell the story on why China is importing so much copper in the context of a global economic contagion. None of them are convincing.

1) The government is stockpiling vast amounts to store value in commodities and/or taking advantage of historic lows to build up reserves while the getting is good

First, I have yet to figure out a convincing reason why a hyper-conservative investing entity would move from Treasury bills to copper as a store of value - the same copper that has fallen almost 3x peak to trough. There is a valid argument that China has a long-term investment horizon but it has repeatedly shown that it likes to act like a drawdown-shy pension fund. Diversifying for China would be buying other government bonds, not buying pseudo-strategic resources for its industrial complex. As for the second reason attributed to this cause, if true, it seems an unsustainable demand driver. Once China has filled up the tank and goes away satisfied, what then? There is also a minor quibble that if it were true, one would think China would be a little more subtle about it's buying and play the market structure a bit better - though the sheer volume hinders that to some degree.

2. China is an economic powerhouse (unlike us capitalist dogs), and despite being a largely export-driven economy, is putting up great production numbers in the face of the worst international collapse in 70 years and needs the copper to fuel the machine

As we have discussed in our last post why we severely doubt the veracity of China's numbers, we won't rehash. However, I don't think we are the only ones to doubt the methodology, political agenda, and reliability of their numbers - a quick Google search will show a number of other luminaries who are highly skeptical. Additionally, we have gotten anecdotal reports that the mood on the ground in China is much less sunny than what we are hearing from the official releases. When the Chinese middle class expands and the currency finally floats, it may be a more sellable story - but until then, it's tough to swallow.

3. Chinese scrap is getting harder to find/salvage/produce/refine, etc.

This is the most puzzling one of them all as we have yet to see any concrete proof that this is true. Instead, most research analysts seem to take this as a given assumption and proceed from there. This is a dangerous precedent as it has the potential for some big shocks if it eventually turns out to not be true. To simply say that Chinese scrap is not as abundant as it once was without data to back it up is a head scratcher, to say the least. If readers can shed some light on this, would be interested to hear more: cornelius@zerohedge.com

4. The SHFE and LME spread copper arb trade

Simply put, if this is true, we can't think of a situation where this doesn't end in tears. The spread admittedly is ridiculously high but given the market barriers, it's unlikely to be the primary driver of aggregate Chinese demand, especially since the Chinese government isn't naturally a market arb player.

In summary, we have to seriously question the fundamentals of the rally in copper. Many of the reasons being tossed around seem unsubstantive and/or unsustainable. However, there may be market forces going around that aren't being discussed and it would be really interesting to get more color on those.



Thanks to BarCap for some of the numbers
Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, April 16, 2009

The false Chinese driven rally in copper

Much has been made about the Chinese connection with regards to copper demand since our last piece on the subject. This piece indicates that Chinese are gearing up for a manufacturing and construction rebound as supplies fall, prices rise, and Chinese indicators are showing bullish signs that are increasingly rare - being first order positive rather than second order. However, we don't see this as a continuing trend and have to stick with the fundamentals that we highlighted in the previous post.

The biggest addition to the discussion has to be a serious consideration of how accurate the officially reported China numbers are. While major economic numbers are usually reported with a straight face by the popular media (TV, radio, blogs, etc.) there typically are a number of mental modifiers and gymnastics that we have to apply in order to get to reality. For example, the NAR and NAHB (National Association of Realtors/Home Builders) regularly release numbers that are usually greeted with poorly hidden snickers, especially highlighted in recent times given the real estate market and the positive picture that they attempt to paint. The universal discount factor is always about assessing the releasing body's capacity for underlying motive vs. shame/guilt/outside pressures, etc. On this dimension, we have very little confidence that Chinese manufacturing and GDP numbers are anywhere close to reflecting reality.

As reflected in this Fortune piece, the external view of the US economy seems to be a highlight that capitalism is a failed model. When times are good, capitalism is a tough enough sell but when the system is down for the count the discussion shifts from a philosophical to a political arena. In that context, for a country like China, we have to seriously doubt the veracity of their numbers and the conclusions that can be drawn thereof. As we have mentioned previously, the best way to assess China is in a (1 - rest of world) model and based on that picture, and the highly export-driven nature of the Chinese economy we have to believe that copper is likely to fall once the unsustainable reserve buying dries up and the current market insanity subsides. Of course, we are not as well-versed in the geopolitics of the area but it certainly is an area which we will do more research on and post our thoughts over the next few weeks.

If anyone has good research on the subject, send it over: cornelius@zerohedge.com
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Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Trade regulations may start being scrutinized

When times were good, the trade/currency situation with China was a cause that was railed about only by academics and obscure politicians. Whenever the issue was brought up, it was politically expedient to sweep it under the carpet rather than bring it up with the Chinese and explain what the potential problem would be i.e. a huge sucking noise sending dollars to China. The explanation at the time was that we didn't want to "anger the Chinese" about trade and currency policy, as if the entire nation was a petulant 8 year old who didn't want to give up his cheap, plastic, extremely-low-cost-of-labor toy. The end result was predictable; the US ended up with overly cheap money and China ended up with way too many dollars. Both results are now each respective nation's biggest financial problems.

Well - times may be changing. Today, the latest annual trade report was released and the US Trade Representative's office released numerous examples of unfair trade practices from both China and the EU. Given the current export environment, it's feasible that this administration may actually do something about it this time. The subsidy to Chinese/European exporters over the past number of years is economically not justifiable, especially given the current top economic priority of job creation and massive resulting debt creation to fund that.

Additionally, the Treasury is set to release its semi-annual report on foreign exchange trade practices in a couple of weeks. The Democrats complained bitterly during Bush Jr.'s terms about this specific issue and are probably expecting some big moves by Obama, symbolic or otherwise. Since Obama was a vocal critic of Chinese currency manipulation during his campaign, there is going to be some clear accountability on this one.

If changes do happen in this area, this will cause massive dislocations in almost every major market. Some may call it a principled administration finally being in power, others will label it a desperate country with its back against the wall. Either way, it's long overdue. Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

The Chinese are coming!

You know the US is screwed when China is lecturing us on capitalism. 

Luo Ping, a director general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, gave a speech in NYC decrying the upcoming depreciation of the dollar and proclaiming that China has no option other than to continue to buy US credit. 

Mr Luo, speaking at the Global Association of Risk Management’s 10th Annual Risk Management Convention, said: “Except for US Treasuries, what can you hold?” he asked. “Gold? You don’t hold Japanese government bonds or UK bonds. US Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option.”

Mr Luo, whose English tends toward the colloquial, added: “We hate you guys. Once you start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion [$1,000bn-$2,000bn] . . .we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do.”

However, Mr Luo said Chinese officials would encourage its banks to finance domestic mergers and acquisitions rather than provide rescue finance to distressed financial companies in other countries: “There will be no bottom-fishing of financial institutions, particularly in the US, because there is a lot of uncertainty about the quality of the books.”

Luo goes on to decry the repeal of Glass-Steagall and posits that additional regulation in the financial industry may not be the worst thing.

Reading this, a lot sticks out. Why can't the Chinese buy British, Japanese or European debt? Currency exposure isn't a concern anymore. Why can't they reinvest domestically? China is clearly trying to defend it's massive stash of US government IOUs but look for them to quietly move away going forward. 

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Sunday, February 15, 2009

China Escalates Treasury Purchasing Debate

The topic of whether China has decided it has had enough of U.S. Treasuries, or is just posturing, has gained significant traction recently. The latest development comes from Luo Ping, an official at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, who said holding U.S. government bonds "is not the only option for investing reserves." According to Bloomberg:

U.S. debt is one option in addition to gold and other government debt, Luo, head of the training center at the banking regulator, was quoted as saying in an interview with [China News Service] late yesterday. If the U.S. government issues too much debt in its efforts to revive the economy, all Treasury holders will suffer losses, he added, the Chinese-language report said.
This comes on the heels of his prior announcement that there are few alternatives to holding U.S. debt, exacerbating the potential diplomatic ramifications. While conventional wisdom is that any change in the Chinese status quo with regard to Treasury purchases would be Mutually Assured Destruction, the increasing amount of chatter coming out of high up individuals discussing displeasure with this status quo should not be simply dismissed.

Ironically, this statement comes on the heels of Israel's disclosure that it plans on selling sovereign bonds abroad to finance its projected $7.4 billion deficit this year, and a day after Germany was unable to find enough buyers for the most recent issue of 10-Year Bunds. While China will likely not cease purchasing government securities altogether, it will definitely have an abundance of upcoming supply to choose from, making Geithner's job all that more difficult as he embarks on the most comprehensive Treasury issuance campaign in recent history. Sphere: Related Content