Showing posts sorted by relevance for query bonds. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query bonds. Sort by date Show all posts

Sunday, June 14, 2009

An Open Letter To The Secretary Of The Department Of The United States Treasury

Dear Mr. Geithner:

No doubt you are already aware of the wild stories circulating in response to the news that two Japanese nationals were caught trying to smuggle some $134 billion in U.S. Government bearer bonds into Switzerland from Italy. Since the Secret Service seems a bit slow in addressing the issue (What's the problem? Haven't you hired an undersecretary of Secret Service motivation yet? Couldn't you get Agent Frank Horrigan out of retirement and send him on special assignment or something?) and the Italians change their story about the instruments almost as often as they change governments, we thought you might benefit from some of our analysis.

Obviously, with respect to authenticity, there are three options:

1. All the documents are fake.

2. Some of the documents are fake.

3. None of the documents are fake.

Taking these in order-

1. All the documents are fake. (Likely)

If all the documents are fake then the possibilities narrow to some degree:

Perhaps the work of a technically sophisticated but socially inept counterfeiting operation that is most likely attempting to dupe gullible private citizens or low-level managers. As of today an Italian Colonel in the Guardia di Finanza was complimenting the workmanship of the documents and speculating some of them might be authentic (at least to the European press). Leaving aside for a moment the rather dire career consequences such pronouncements might have, one assumes the Italians have some experience with forged documents. Admittedly, however, such expertise might not readily flow up to an officer politically focused enough to reach the rank of Colonel in any Italian organization. (I think I met one at a party in Miami once).

It would be a short-lived game once someone tried to pass one to an institution of any note. One assumes any bank large enough to accept such instruments into anything other than a safe-deposit box has best-practices methods to authenticate them, the key portion of which would be contacting the issuer (since the Fed doesn't issue/hasn't issued bonds like this, this would have to be the Treasury). Obviously, the Treasury would maintain specimen copies and make these available via facsimile transmission for a first-blush gut check. Still, Swiss institutions are highly unlikely to accept even authentic bearer instruments from a U.S. issuer without a very detailed provenience investigation. Further, even bearer bonds are serialized, meaning that it should be a trivial matter to establish if the securities these documents purport to be were actually issued. As technically sophisticated as such forgeries might be, absent access to authentic originals, details like issue dates and proper serial numbers would be hard to obtain.

Some support for this theory:

None of the coupons on the various documents appear to have been clipped. Since the Treasury has not issued bearer bonds since 1982 or 1985 (depending who at Treasury you ask) if these documents were authentic someone has taken a serious inflation beating on the deferred interest payments. (Turns out that high denomination instruments weren't printed after late 1969).

The Treasury claims that less than 1% of "marketable securities" are in bearer form. $134 billion in bearer bonds would imply some $13 trillion in marketable securities (assuming that class includes these bonds). This conflicts with the amount of "Total Marketable U.S. Treasury Securities Outstanding" for November 2008, as reported in Table B-87 of the 2009 "Economic Report of the President." That document lists total Marketable U.S. Treasury Securities Outstanding" as $5.82 trillion. All outstanding Treasury securities are listed in the same table as $10.66 trillion with "Unmarketable Securities" taking up $4.83 trillion. Note that in the category of "Marketable Securities" "Treasury Bonds" are listed at a "mere" $594.6 billion.

Even if we choose to discount the Treasury's offhand "1%" figure, it is difficult to imagine that a huge portion of the outstanding treasury securities would be in the form just a few, similar documents that somehow found their way into a single briefcase on the Swiss-Italian border.

High quality counterfeit "Federal Reserve Bonds" and the like are apparently common and seem to originate from Indonesia and other places where unrest has permitted high quality presses to fall into nefarious hands.

2. Some of the documents are fake. (Possible).

This would be quite possible if our two Ninja Smugglers were delivering a sample original document and a set of fake duplicates to show a buyer the quality of the forgeries. In this case you are still dealing with a technically competent counterfeiting operation, but now you have one with access to at least one of the originals. That begins to feel like a state sponsored operation, or, at the very least, a rather amazing theft story. One wonders why the theft of a $500 million bearer bond (the smallest possible denomination according to the Guardia di Finanza) would not be reported, but stranger things have happened behind the walls of an embarrassed bank.

The Treasury did in fact issue $500 million denominated instruments between 1955 and 1969, starting in early 1955 along with $100 million instruments. In fact, all of the Treasury bonds printed in the early 1950s were bearer instruments with coupons. Imagine processing half a million coupons and you start to understand why the larger denominations were attractive. The last were apparently printed in late 1969. It seems clear that $1 billion instruments were never issued. Those would appear to be forgeries.

Taking the "theft" example, having no hope of passing the document (provenience investigation) one could still maximize value by counterfeiting it and, as before, selling the result to foreign intelligence services, governments, or just gullible American/Japanese/French tourists in Italy/Switzerland.

It is also entirely possible that this is the work of a government. (Foreign or domestic). There is quite a great deal of precedent here The German Operation Bernhard, named for SS Major Bernhard Krüger, forged a huge number of small and medium denomination Bank of England pound notes during World War II, to provide their agents with currency, to pay for war material from foreign sources and to destabilize the British economy. At its peak the work was of such high quality that the Bank of England itself readily accepted the currency. Over GBP 100,000,000 was printed just in 1945. The Germans actually planned... wait for it... wait for it... to drop the currency from airplanes over England (apparently the very few helicopters that existed at the time had insufficient range) but the Luftwaffe, badly weakened by then, did not have the air power. Examples of the notes still occasionally turn up though the Bank of England invalidated several series of the relevant currency denominations in response to the counterfeits.

More recently, the origins of high quality forgeries of $100 notes, the "PN-14342" family, have been attributed to Iran (which printed its own currency on Intaglio presses prior to the revolution) North Korea, Russia and even the CIA (permitting it to evade congressional budget oversight).

Motives for foreign counterfeiting of such notes should be obvious. They are less so, perhaps, for high denomination bearer bonds. This is the hitch in this "fake" bit. That's a lot of bonds to have in the same place and one assumes even a Guardia di Finanza Cadet would notice if the serial numbers were all the same and not bother to pester the American Secret Service for authentication. Why print more than one serial number with such high denominations? Lot of work, that. Could it really be that no one noticed this? (Well, it is Italy, after all).

3. None of the documents are fake (unlikely).

For the purposes of amusement, and delving for a moment into (REALLY into) the realm of aluminum foil (Haven't you ever stopped to wonder who it was who pulled real tin-foil off the market and forced everyone to move to the aluminum variety? And why?) there is the (slim) possibility that you printed the damn things. That splits us into a number of alternatives:

Some foreign government (no corporate entity or individual has $134 billion laying around) has been holding the things to use as portable cash in emergencies. (This would explain the lack of coupon clipping- who cares about interest when you are just looking for portable wealth?) Or perhaps they haven't even been holding them for a long while, but exchanged them recently to facilitate their clandestine cross-border movement- perhaps even with the acquiescence/assistance of the Treasury. (After all, it would look pretty bad if that much U.S. debt was moved around openly). Here ya go [China (~$760 billion)/Japan (~$680 billion)/Russia (~$140 billion)] a bunch of bearer bonds we had laying around in the archives so you can smuggle the things into Switzerland.

Technically the difference between a valid and invalid Treasury bond is the willingness of the Treasury to accept it. Excellent deniability here. If anything at all happens you can just disavow the documents, reissue some other ones, or not, whatever. This would answer the question "how did anyone think that any bank would accept such large denominations?" The Treasury would validate the documents, of course. This would, however, not answer the question as to why two individuals traveling on Japanese passports would be attempting to slip into Switzerland in the best amateur hour smuggling operation since the guy who dropped two kilos of cocaine on the floor while standing at the immigration counter at JFK.

What might answer that question in this highly unlikely but entertaining scenario is the fact that this sort of rank incompetence is quite characteristic of the Japanese generally and Japanese Intelligence (Naikaku Jōhō Chōsashitsu) specifically. Hardly a month goes by without news of some executive with a case filled with brand new U.S. hundred dollar bills in Tokyo. At one point in 1998 a briefcase with $50 million in negotiable instruments was left in the Tokyo subway by an intoxicated bank executive.

Perhaps Japan wants to move capital offshore in preparation for general hostilities related to North Korea's increasingly evident mental deficiency.

We have heard a few reports that the individuals weren't arrested (though these aren't well sourced) and the Japanese consulate doesn't seem to know (or want to tell anyone) if they are actually Japanese nationals. (What's the hold up? You've got passports and passport numbers. Should be a matter of hours to get that figured out).

We would be remiss if we did not point out the (fanciful) possibility that this was the Treasury's doing entirely. Why?

Perhaps you intentionally orchestrated the discovery of the instruments which you will now rule counterfeit to cast doubt on similar instruments you would prefer not to redeem. (Play rough with us, China, see what happens).

Perhaps you were establishing credit with a foreign financial institution from which you could buy more Treasuries (hah) or otherwise buoy the market (S&P 500 futures are a popular theory for manipulation these days) without tipping the Treasury/Fed's hand in the process. (Credit Suisse and UBS both have enough AUM to conceal a "mere" $134 billion).

Perhaps you wanted an easy way to tip the debt crippled Italy 40% of $134 billion (the forfeiture fine for failing to declare) without congressional oversight. That buys a lot of Fiats. China or Japan will probably be blamed for the "incident" and no one will be surprised if it is hushed up. Instead everyone will assume that the remaining 60% went back to the original holder and Italy gets $53 billion without a lot of questions. Clever, Mr. Geithner, JamesTim Geithner.

Of course, any of these "they're real" options brings up a rather serious question:

Since these securities appear to have been off the books, and none of the Treasury disclosures about foreign or domestic holdings would seem to support this many bearer instruments (much less this many in the same place) how do we (does anyone) ever believe any statements about the size of outstanding U.S. debt again?

Whatever the case you have to admit that it is a sad state of affairs when, under your stewardship of the Department of the Treasury, an incident like this stirs up even the slightest suspicion rather than being immediately relegated to pages of "Treasury Debt of Honor," the latest Tom Clancy pulp to be found in the "thriller" section of one of LaGuardia's HMSHost owned bookstores.

We challenge you to do the right thing. That, of course, is to come out with a clear, concise statement ending the sort of speculation that, while currently confined to fringe financial blogs, has begun to creep into major outlets. (Handelsbaltt, for instance). Be careful, though. If someone suddenly notices that Italy has gone on a spending spree (Dodge Vipers for EVERYONE!) we hope you have a good lawyer. (Though, after the Turbo Tax Teflon, we suppose that's not really an issue). Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, March 7, 2009

The Bank Nationalization Arbitrage Play

When the hotdog vendor you buy lunch from talks about the impending nationalization of Citigroup, it is fair to say that nationalization risk is "priced in" Citi's (and all other financials') securities. And while the risk that the government will take over Citi, BofA and the other major banks is palpable, the upside in shorting bank stocks is very limited (BAC can only go down another $3.14 while Citi is a frequent visitor to the 99c club), especially considering the downside risk in the form of a squeeze, which can be easily observed by looking at the market action in the last 30 minutes of trading on Friday (for retail investors who bought into this short covering wave thinking this could be the indicator of a market bottom, our condolences).

Nonetheless, a unique way to play the nationalization threat, with limited downside and potentially substantial upside, does exist in the form of a Parent (HoldCo) - Bank bond basis trade.

The dramatic widening in financial CDS over the past several weeks is the result of bank CDS referencing the bank Parent (aka HoldCo), level, or the most comprehensive and risky layer of a bank.



In several instances a financial Senior - Sub relationship can be exploited via CDS, however in the case of a default event both are likely to converge to comparable recovery levels as there not yet been a case of split preferential treatment of Sr/Sub debt classes in a bank nationalization. A potentially more lucrative and less risky way to play the creeping nationalization threat is via a Bank-Parent arbitrage. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Lehman brothers bankruptcy case: Barclays, which balked at the prospect of purchasing Lehman HoldCo which contained that toxic dump of all of Lehman's worthless CMBS "assets", jumped at the opportunity of buying Lehman's Bank assets (and associated debt), even more so that it ended up being a transaction in which bank assets were purchased for nanocents on the dollar (golf clap for Lehman creditors' legal advisor Milbank Tweed for allowing this daylight robbery to occur). Lehman HoldCo debt is now trading around 13 cents while FSB/bank debt was in the 80s and virtually doesn't trade. The reason why the government may be interested in a Parent-Bank bifurcation is that roughly 70% of bank debt outstanding is at the parent level according to Bank of America, which suggests that if the government finally does come around to a dramatic recapitalization of the zombie banks, it is likely that the Bank level would be supported while the Parent would be wiped out.


The arbitrage in this case would be purchasing bonds guaranteed by the Banks while shorting bonds not guaranteed by the Bank/only by the Parent. This relationships can be seen by comparing the relative spreads of JPM's 6% bonds due 10/1/2017 (Bank guarantee, A+ rating) versus JPM's 6.125% bonds due 6/27/2017 (Parent guarantee, A rating).




As can be seen from recent market action, the bond spread has started to diverge as traders being to exploit this relationship. Nonetheless, the current spread is still only 100 bps. A Lehman-like resolution would result in the spread exploding, as Parent bonds hit cash prices in the teens, while Bank bonds drop only marginally. Also, as the worst case scenario is pari passu treatment, the spread can at most converge to 0. On a $10 million basis this implies the maximum downside is $100,000, while the upside could be well over $5 million: this should be a much more acceptable risk/return scenario to any trader who is betting on a sweeping bank nationalization, but is unwilling to take on the common stock short squeeze or creeping nationalization risk. Additionally, the trade could double up as nationalization insurance, since bank CDS are trading at levels at which it makes no sense to actually use them for "protection" purposes due to exorbitant carry costs (absent a pair trade with matched bonds, which is in fact a trade that has been aggressively implemented over the past 2 weeks, and which the administration should be very concerned about due to the perverted inherent incentives of basis holders to see the eventual bankruptcy of the underlying security). Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, March 1, 2009

More Bank Bashing Fodder

When the execs of the biggest banks came to congress two weeks ago to be on the wrong end of some populist lynching, one of the questions asked was how much money had the banks earned by collecting underwriting fees by issuing FDIC-backed bank bonds, i.e. debt in which there is no risk. Intuitively this is a great question, as underwriters collect fees only when there is exposure risk, essentially they are paid to find buyers for a risky issue in which they are the primary purchasers. If there is no implicit risk, as in when they are issuing government backed debt and the bank is merely a pass thru of a government guarantee, it is mindboggling that banks should be compensated for this form of "underwriting."

The FT has done some investigative journalism into this topic. Turns out banks have pocketed nearly $1 billion in underwriting fees from placing government-backed debt. While European banks charge 0.15% on FDIC guaranteed bank bonds, their US counterparts demand twice as much or 0.3%. While at first glance this is a mere fraction of the fees that banks demand to issue Investment Grade and High Yield bonds, at 1% and 3% respectively, the numbers quickly start to add up when one considers the total size of the FDIC backed market. Morgan Stanley estimates that $634 billion worth of new bonds could be sold this year using European government guarantees. The situation in the US is likely comparable, implying over $1 trillion in FDIC debt is poised to come to market. If one assumes a blended 0.2% fee on this new debt, banks are set to pocket over $2 billion in fees for something which one can argue they should receive no fees for whatsoever, for two reasons: i) without these FDIC backed instruments, banks would likely not function at all as they would have no way to access the capital markets by traditional means and ii) the fees are going straight from the taxpayers' pockets to pad for bonuses for bond traders and salespeople in TARP-recipient banks, who are the largest underwriters of FDIC guaranteed bonds. Granted, the government does take a small portion off the top from banks selling guaranteed bonds, but it is nominal compared to the total potential and actual revenue stream.

The biggest abuser of this loophole is easily JP Morgan, which not only charges an arm and a leg for FDIC issuance, but also pockets fees for bonds that it itself issues! If there was ever a massive conflict of interest, this is it: apparently, the house of Dimon shared $123 million in fees with underwriters for raising $30 billion in debt. But as one bond banker said, the FDIC-backed asset class has become "one of the best fee-earners" for banks in recent months. It is likely that TARP recipients will fight tooth and nail from losing this one last remaining source of revenue against the worst underwriting and advisory investment banking climate of all time. Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Guardia di Finanza to [Bloomberg/Handelsblatt]: Bonds Probably [Fake/Real]

Handelsblatt (June 13):

As for the authenticity of the "Kennedy-Bonds," we still have doubts, but the U.S. government bonds (worth/in denominations of ? ) some 358 million euros seem (credible/ believable). They are made of filigree paper of excellent quality," said [Colonel Rodolfo] Mecarelli.

Was die Echtheit der Kennedy-Bonds angeht, haben wir noch Zweifel, aber die US-Staatsanleihen im Wert von rund 358 Millionen Euro scheinen glaubwürdig. Sie sind aus Filigranpapier von ausgezeichneter Qualität“, so Mecarelli.


Bloomberg (June 12):

The bonds, with a face value of more than $134 billion, are probably forgeries, Colonel Rodolfo Mecarelli of the Guardia di Finanza in Como, Italy, said today.


What a difference... a day makes....

Apparently the Secret Service has been asked to authenticate the instruments. (Gee, that only took a week).

Tim Geithner was in Italy yesterday to chat with the Russians and the Japanese- both obviously big debt holders. Wonder why he didn't just cruise over to the border and check out the docs?




From today's mail bag:

Greetings from Milan,

This letter must come to you as a big surprise, but I believe it is only a day that people meet and become great friends and business partners. I am Mr. Shoichi Nakagawa, former Finance Minister for a Group of 7 country. I write you this proposal in good faith, believing that I can trust you with the information I am about to reveal to you.

I have an urgent and very confidential business proposition for you. In February of this year an agent of a foreign power spiked my cold medicine with opiates causing me to nod off during an important press conference. I was subsequently forced to resign in disgrace.

As my termination loomed I took the chance to retain US DOLLARS 134 BILLION in negotiable bearer bonds I found forgotten in the dusty bottom drawer of the prime minister's desk. I have since, by the grace of God, deposited these documents with trusted associates in Italy.

As I am under constant surveillance I cannot directly deposit these bonds without the help of a foreigner and that is why I am contacting you for an assistance. My associates will travel to Switzerland by train to deliver the documents to the Swiss banking organization of your choice.

If you accept to work with me, I want you to state how you wish us to share the funds in percentage, so that both parties will be satisfied. If you are interested, contact me as soon as you receive this message so we can go over the details. Thanking you in advance and may God bless you. Please, treat with utmost confidentiality.

I wait your urgent response.
Regards,

Mr. Shoichi Nakagawa
Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, January 31, 2009

The ISDA CDS Settlement Auction is A Hidden Goldmine for Cash-Rich Accounts

When I discussed the basis trade opportunity, the conclusion was that arbitrage in the secondary (and by extension primary) market exists due to significant dislocations in liquidity. Sure, one can argue that immediate culprits for the arbitrage have to do with counterparty risk and funding costs, which makes sense, but those are merely derivatives of the liquidity disconnects between different brokers, their accounts, and any permutations thereof.

The problem with the basis trade, as Merrill and many others experienced, is that in the period of time before its par unwind, a lot of crazy stuff can happen that can force stop losses triggers, significant margin calls, and the overall liquidation of your business.

In the CDS realm a comparable "risk-free" strategy is participating in ISDA-mediated physically settled credit default swap auctions. These occur roughly a month after the ISDA council determines there has been a "credit event" in a given corporate name (most usually filing of bankruptcy, or some other default variations). As there will be many bankruptcies this year, and numerous physical settlement auctions, accounts that have liquidity can generate quick, practically riskless returns arising from a liquidity-fundamental value disconnect. In fact the most recent ISDA calendar indicates there are quite a few auctions coming up:
  • Millennium America, February 3
  • Lyondell, February 3
  • Equistar, February 3
  • Sanitec, February 5
  • British Vita, February 9
  • Nortel, February 10
  • Smurfit-Stone, TBD
One thing to note is that virtually any account which trades fixed income can participate in the auction, it is not limited to parties which have preexisting CDS relationships with the defaulted entity.

So in terms of a chronological summary (for the full chronolgy in the Lehman case, click here. Also props for whoever finds the rather big mistake ISDA made in compiling this schedule, hint: Tembec)
  • A few days before the auction ISDA prints the list of deliverable obligations that will be allowed to settle physically - many times these are most of the corporate bonds of an issuer, but in some very complex cases (Lehman and FNM/FRE most notably) only a certain percentage of bonds are selected.
  • The day before the auction, ISDA publishes the full list of participating bidders which will serve as the clearing agents to make sure all offers are exhausted.
  • On the day of the auction many things happen in rapid succession. The key items to keep track of are the submission of the amount of bonds one is willing to purchase and at what price, the determination of open interest (amount of bonds that have to be purchased in the auction by various dealers), and the final price, which Creditex posts at 2 pm on the auction date, which is also the close of the auction. It is important to understand that physical settlements are Dutch auctions: i.e. clearance occurs at the lowest price at which all net sell interest is absorbed. Therefore, a bidder does not stand to lose by placing a low ball bid as it may very well end up the critical one, and result in the final price.

Due to the significant residual overhang of protection sellers in the 2003-2007 period, most auctions end up with a net open sell interest. Let's take the case of Lehman:

After dealers submit preliminary inside bid indications, they are allowed to participate in the auction. The final bid price is based not on the inside bids but the actual limit orders (a combination of broker and customer orders) at which the Dutch auction clears.



The next important step is determining the Net Buy/Sell interest. As noted, most auctions are entered into with a net open sell interest due to excessive protection selling which is one of the main reason for the arbitrage. As presented, in the Lehman case, despite nearly $150 billion of defaulted unsecured debt, there was only $4.9 billion in net open interest (offered), proving all doomsayers of the CDS market wrong, as at its core it is a fundamentally very efficient market, regardless if it trades OTC or on an exchange.

After the net open interest is calculated, bidders submit limit bids which is where the liquidity arbitrage truly comes into play. The Lehman auction is probably not the best example of the arbitrage as two of the bidders had market-conflicting interests, although it will still demonstrate the point (Barclays which had legacy interests from its Lehman broker/dealer acquisition, and JPM which had the government's backstop at this point and likely other derivative interests in clearing bonds at a certain price). The chart below shows the cumulative total bid interest by pricing bucket (again for the full backup check out the Creditex link above).



Notable here is that the preponderance of bids are at ridiculously low levels, with the average of the total $132 billion notional in submitted bids (which is surprisingly close to the total amount of outstanding debt - perhaps dealers and accounts had assumed that as much as the total unsecured debt may be open to physical settlement) in the 2-3 cent range. Obviously many bidders were focused on the Dutch aspect of the auction, trying to aggressively lowball the market. As the final net sell interest was relatively low in comparison with the total bid interest, $4.9 Bn vs. $132 Bn, the clearing price was higher than the average. However, as mentioned above, JPM and Barclays, which likely had other motives in terms of procuring Lehman securities, alone accounted for $2.5 billion of the $4.9 billion in effective bids. Without these the final price would have had a 7 handle.

The key aspect of the ISDA auction, is that it significantly reprices the secondary market of the existing securities (which at least in theory is determined by fundamentals) based on an exercise in liquidity. It is feasible that with much larger open interest the ISDA auction may have cleared at 5, even 4. Why is this important? Because Lehmans' bonds in the days before the auction traded at markedly higher prices. As an example, let's take the 6.625% Notes due 1/2012, which in the three day prior to the auction closed with an average price of 12.5. (Chart below)



As representative Lehman bonds had been trading in low teens (in this example the 6.625% Notes closed at 13 on October 9, the day before the auction, according to TRACE) the highest bid bucket will almost certainly be below the market price. And this is where the arbitrage comes into play. Managers who wish to enter a specific bankrupt security don't have to buy it in the open market if there is an ISDA auction approaching - they merely have to submit a reasonably discounted bid in the ISDA auction in order to be able to purchase the security, by taking advantage of the liquidity dislocations in the market. Here, the ISDA clearing price of 8.625 was about 35% lower than the prior closing price (13) for an indicative Lehman issue which was a deliverable. This is also sometimes called the cheapest to deliver phenomenon as the clearing price will very likely always be lower than the market price of the cheapest trading security in the secondary market that is part of the deliverable schedule per ISDA.

The liquidity part of the equation comes into play when one considers that fewer and fewer dealers and funds have lots of spare cash lying around to participate in these kinds of auctions. Once an account submits a formal bid (bid and notional), it is binding. Which is why in many of the upcoming ISDA auctions (Lyondell will likely be the most anticipated one) a buysider may make off like a bandit merely by submitting a large, substantially out of the money big which gets triggered when the Dutch auction doesn't find filling bids on the way down.

Admittedly, there are many more nuances to the physical settlement process (could discuss offline time permitting), but in a nutshell it is a great opportunity for still liquid accounts to purchase bonds in bankrupt entities at a significant discount to market values. If one chooses so, these may be flipped immediately in the open market which still trades substantially higher than the auction results (in Lehman's case on the day after the auction, the 6.625% bonds closed at 9.6% allowing for a 10% return in one day).

There are odd exceptions: the Fannie/Freddie physical settlement auction ended up in some surprising results, where due to technical considerations, the subs ended up with a higher clearing price than the seniors (there is good literature out on the net as to why this happened). Additionally the final auction Creditex document provides some very good insight into which broker/dealers may have liquidity constraints. The Lehman auction specifically demonstrated that Morgan Stanley is severely strapped for cash: despite their inside bid/offer levels of 8.25/10.25, they indicated firm limit orders only below 5 cents. The upcoming auction results will provide a rare glimpse into just how cash limited (or not) broker dealers are currently: I would keep an eye out on Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill and RBS. If the liquidity malaise is indeed spreading, funds will be able to take advantage of the brokers' troubles, and purchase securities at some very significant discounts to prevailing market rates.
Sphere: Related Content

Monday, May 18, 2009

Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of May 14

The squeeze in credit continues, however now with a twist. While tightening was a dominant theme as it has been in the past 10 weeks, average loans tightened by 31 bps (from a much tighter average absolute spread), more than than double the absolute spread tightening in bonds, which tightened by "only" 16 bps. Also, as expected, the tightening in the recent heatseeked names ended, and Huntsman and Neiman Marcus bonds both blew out wider, reversing the trend from recent weeks, which was most acute in last week's data set. Curiously, the squeeze in TRW seems to be trying to compete with that in the Citi arb, as the bonds have tightened by approximately 1,600 bps from the beginning of April. The bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler it appears have no impact on this auto supplier at all.

At this rate, the credit market will soon be back to February levels where one could establish negative basis trades between loans and bonds (absent as the market has normalized over the past 2 months).





Data source: Loan Pricing Corporation Sphere: Related Content

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of May 21

The first tightening in both asset classes, as loans widened by 3 bps and bonds: by 12 bps. Third derivative? Continuing on the theme from the prior week, Neiman Marcus bonds continue widening and now the bonds have joined the party as well. The biggest bond widener last week was First Data, while the squeeze is likely extracting the last few drops of blood from Sealy shorts. Look for the inevitable pullback over the next few days.

Some bizarro world factoids: Aeroflex, Laureate and Pantry loans widened while bonds tightened.





Data from LoanConnector Sphere: Related Content

Monday, April 27, 2009

Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of April 23

Tightening continues in the universe of 30 tracked names although at a much more moderated pace compared to the prior week. The average loan spread tightened by 24 bps to 674 bps while bonds tightened by 64 bps to 1,317 bps from the prior week. The equity market squeeze continues, and while the squeeze in Neiman Marcus bonds is over, Sealy's is continuing unabated: following last weeks 800 bps tightening, this week Sealy collapsed another 600 bps. And as in the prior week, Sealy loans barely moved. TRW also saw a significant tightening in both bonds and loans.

Some other odd data: in the universe of loans tightening and bond widening we have Neiman Marcus at a 150 bps spread, while the opposite was true for West Corp, PanAmSat, First Data, BE Aerospace and Alliance Imaging.



Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Univision Settles Lawsuit with Mexicans; Bonds Spike

After a long and costly battle between highly leveraged Hispanic TV company Univision, which was LBOed in late 2006 by a consortium of billionaire Haim Saban, Madison Dearborn, Providence, Tommy Lee and TGP, for $13.7, and has a bout $10 billion of mostly covenant lite debt, and Mexican soap opera maker Televisa, the two have finally decided to settle this afternoon.

As a result the company bonds and loans all were up: the 1st lien cov-lite TL was up 5 points to 52, the 7.85% bonds due 2011 were well bid in the low 60s, while the 9.75% Toggle notes due 2015 were up 2 to 21.

Curious if the $3.7 billion of equity "value" is still marked on the books of any of its sponsors. Anyway, as the company has a debt/EBITDA of 14x, the answer probably doesn't matter. March 15th is the next interest payment date on the PIK notes, which will likely be paid in kind (i.e.more debt) so a critical date for bondholders will likely be July 15 when the 7.875% have an coupon due. Most credit fund managers by then will likely be on permanent vacation, which explains the daytrading enthusiasm to bid up the bonds today.
Sphere: Related Content

Friday, June 12, 2009

Federal Reserve Open Market Operations: June 12

The chart below indicates the Fed's YTD open market treasury purchases. Roughly $32 billion in bonds/bills has been bought since the last update 2 weeks ago. The chart below can be traced back the Federal Reserve of New York's website here.



More notable were the Fed's open market operations around and on the days of the fateful 10 and 30 yr USTs this week. Recall, on June 10th was the abysmal $19 billion auction for 10 Yr Treasuries while June 11th saw a surprisingly strong $11 billion in 30 Years. Pulling the NY Fed's OMO data for these days yields the following results:



As the data indicate on the day of the $19 billion in 10 Yr UST, the Fed was concurrently bidding on almost $11 billion (of which $3.5 billion was accepted) of what most likely were 10 years: more than 50% of the full Treasury auction. Furthermore, the day before, the Fed purchased $7.5 billion in 3.5 - 5 years after submitting nearly $30 billion in bid requests. This is the same day that $30 billion in 3 years Treasuries were auctioned off at 1.96%. Has the Federal Reserve been keep the clearing price conveniently low by purchasing comparable trasuries on or near the days of critical auctions? Open market purchases seem to indicate that is in fact the case.

In summary - last week's bond market exhibited unprecedented volatility: spreads between USTs and agencies fluctuated drastically, prices were all over the palce, the Fed was concurrently conducting OM purchases as the Treasury was auctioning off bonds in the primary market... cats and dogs living together, etc... And keep in mind total activity this past week was under $100 billion. There is still well over $1 trillion in bonds to be autioned off this year alone. If anyone is foolish enough to predict just what will happen with the long bond, the 2s10s, T-bills, etc. by year end, please speak up.

Well, I will take one stab: the irony is that while Zero Hedge is in the near-term deflationist camp (at least in principle), the supply of bonds will likely be the technical factor that determines price levels over the next 6 months, more so than economic outlook. As such, we expect volatility to persist, and the curve, especially the long dated stuff, to widen, even as household net worth continues plummeting (or as a result of). Inflationists, will, of course, read into this as an inflationary sign and buy every barrel of oil they can find while screaming bloody inflation as CNBC reverberates it to the moon and back since it jives with exactly what the Administration is hoping: that Joe Sixpack goes out and maxes his credit card just like in the good old days. But the last is not and will not be happening... So the conundrum continues. (The only thing certain is death, taxes, and that JP Morgan will forever be gunning those pesky 5k SPY blocks.) Sphere: Related Content

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Equity Investment Perspectives In The REIT Space

Zero Hedge has voiced its thoughts on the matter repeatedly (to the point where a broken record sounds outright creative) so I will present those of BCA Research instead, as the latter has some notable conclusions on the rationality of equity investments into the REIT sector.
REITs have historically been at the top of the yield-generating heap, but look to be in jeopardy of losing their appeal as reliable cash flow growth vehicles.

At first blush the attractiveness of REITs looks good. The dividend yield on the S&P REITs group is almost as high as at the end of the relative performance bear market in 2000 (Chart 15). Piling into REITs back then would have generated substantial capital gains as well as an attractive running yield in the subsequent years. But the differences between now and then are enormous.

Many REIT operators took advantage of what looked to be a permanent increase in demand and undertook a rapid facility build out. Our construction composite for the primary REIT sectors has been growing far above-trend for several years. If the residential market is any guide, a prolonged building retrenchment will be needed before underlying property prices will stabilize, especially in view of the plunge in occupancy rates.

Chart 16 highlights a number of indicators of demand. BCA’s REIT demand indicator continues to sink, consistent with a drying up in demand for commercial real estate loans (top panel, Chart 16). Vacancy rates have exploded higher in some categories. Our overall vacancy rate indicator, a composite of our REIT demand and supply indicators, shows that the vacancy rate composite is headed much higher (second panel, Chart 16). Property owners will have a very difficult time raising rents to existing tenants given a glut of unfilled space, and the ability to attract new tenants will be limited until overall economic activity improves significantly. The implication is that generating cash flow growth will become increasingly challenging, and some payouts are at risk of getting slashed.

Adding it up, the REIT sector does not offer an attractive opportunity to gain exposure to income. In fact, excess capacity argues for moving up in the corporate capital structure towards bonds. [very critical to note for investors who just threw a ton of money down the follow-on equity offering chutes in several names]. Deflation risks will hurt earnings before balance sheets. Deleveraging also favors credit over stocks. Perhaps investors are already moving in the direction of corporate bonds. Net sales of corporate bond funds have soared. In contrast, net sales of equity funds continue to sag. Retail investors appear to be looking to take advantage of juicy corporate bond yields that are already pricing in a grim financial outcome in most sectors, including REITs and utilities. The same cannot be said for the REIT sector in the equity market (in relative terms).
In a nutshell - if you really want, nay need, REIT exposure, buy bonds, stay away from equity. If recent stock actions by REITs such as KIMCO and ProLogis benefit anyone, it is the bondholders, since they will see benefits long before any incremental cash flows through to equity holders. Yet bonds have not had nearly comparable moves to what these companies' equity prices have demonstrated (30-60% upside moves in 2 weeks): in short, REIT stock are far ahead of the recovery curve, especially since even bondholders don't believe in significant upside value. Then again, if the whole thesis of marginal upside purchasing on declining volume has been true for the broader market in general and the REIT space in particular, once the real money (quants) becomes a participant in the next market move leg, watch out below. As ML pointed out, the quants have missed the upmove, but one can bet they will not do so with the move lower (not if but when it occurs). The only conclusion - once the flip occurs, and the quants jump on board for the reversion, the carnage will be unprecedented.

Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, March 1, 2009

Exclusive: The Creeping Equitization Of Citi's Capital Structure

Much has been written about the staggering losses of Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal in Citi's common stock. The amount of money he has dropped on Pandit's titanic may have easily funded GM's operations.... for about a day. Now as preferred shareholders have joined the fray of impaired parties, other investor higher in the capital structure are starting to feel Geithner's flamethrower. Enter the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority or ADIA as it is better known. News just out of Reuters that Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth fund, which just happens to be the largest of its kind in the world, is nervous about its $7.5 billion 11% Citi convertible bond investment. The bonds begin converting in March 2010, and through September 2011, ADIA is set to receive 235.6 million shares, at a conversion price between $31.83 and $37.24. Seeing how Citi's common closed at $1.50, ADIA managing director Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed al Nahyan must be depressed about his prospects of breaking even on this investments any time soon if ever. Granted, ADIA will likely not lose too much sleep over this loss - the sovereign wealth fund which recently completed and moved into the tallest skyscaper in Abu Dhabi (insert), had about $850 billion in its portfolio. However with oil dropping from $120 to $30, with or without USO's shennanigans, even the real masters of the petrouniverse must be scratching their beards...
"Nothing has changed from ADIA's perspective at this point. ADIA's convertible bonds are due for conversion in a phased manner between March 2010 and September 2011, and that stands," an Abu Dhabi government official told Reuters. "But it is carefully assessing its options due to the latest events -- although no decision is taken yet," he said, declining to be named.
Ironically, instead of waiting to see the notes thru their conversion, the fund may decide to convert early making a potential full-blown nationalization even more politically charged, due to ADIA's extended web of investments in a plethora of U.S. companies and GSEs. The last thing Geithner can afford is to anger such a huge investing partner as ADIA, and by implication it neighboring sovereign wealth funds of countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Dubai, and Saudi Arabia (for a list of all the major sovereign wealth funds, click here). The real concern should be for other convertible (and potentially higher up in the capital structure securities), who unlike ADIA can ill afford to lose out on their heretofore considered safe investments.
"We know ADIA is following the recent developments closely, but as a bondholder, ADIA's investments are secure because the U.S. government has left bond holders untouched, unlike other investors such as preferred shareholders," a senior Abu Dhabi-based banker close to ADIA said."

However, it is early days, and we need to wait and see what ramifications the latest events would have and whether there would be pressure on investors in bonds to convert (early)," he said.

Citi, he said, has been urging preferred shareholders and convertible bond holders to convert to common stock to help avoid nationalization by the U.S. government.
Indeed, what is becoming more and more obvious, is that while the government is unlikely to wipe out the common stock tranche in Citi and other banks ever (which would be de facto nationalization and by implication a failure of a "too big to fail" bank, which Geithner will simply not allow per Lehman bankruptcy consequences), it will continue a forced creeping dilution of higher and higher tranches of the balance sheet into Citi common stock. Yesterday the preferred, today the convertible stock, tomorrow unsecured and lastly secured bonds. At some point the common may actually be worth something fundamentally, regardless of squeezes and other contraptions. We can only hope that in the process Geithner does not royally anger someone really important along the way as he forces stakeholders to convert into chunks of more and more diluted common stock. The other implication is that holders of higher tranches of Citi securities will follow in the preferred's footsteps and commence shorting against their long holdings in advance expectations of equitization. This further increases the likelihood that every fund and their grandmother will soon be short Citi common, and while a Volkswagen outcome is never a certainty, six sigma events just happen to occur on a daily basis lately. Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of April 16

Some massive tightening in the universe of 30 tracked names with both major loan and bond moves. The average loan spread tightened by 100 bps to 700 bps while bonds tightened by almost 200 bps to 1,381 bps from two weeks ago. Taking a cue from the equity markets, the most horrendous HY names saw the biggest tightening with Neiman Marcus and Sealy Mattress bonds both collapsing by over 800 bps. Curiously Sealy's loan only tightened by 20 bps, implying a long loan, short bond trade could be a good continuation trade here. The inverse is true with Cenveo, which saw its loans tighten by over 400 bps, while the bonds tightened a mere 207 bps (with TRS being a little tough to find these days, a one side bond long may be the most feasible trade).





source: Reuters/LPC Loanconnector Sphere: Related Content

Monday, May 4, 2009

Loans Versus Bonds Relative Value: Week Of April 30

Just when we thought the heat-seeking short squeeze in credit land may be subsiding, three new bonds rip tighter: old shorter max-pain name Neiman Marcus, whose bonds tightened by 540 bps, Graham Packaging which ripped by 550 bps and Huntsman Int'l which tightened by 425 bps. As in the last week, the rolling equity squeeze in unique stocks and sectors has caused comparable squeezes in corresponding highly-shorted credits.

Some odd names that stand out this week with respect to a disproportionate widening in loans and a tightening in bonds are: BE Aerospace, Centennial Communications, Constellation Brands, First Data Corp and Pantry, although the moves are marginal enough to be likely noise.



Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, March 26, 2009

What's Up Or Rather Down With The EUR And General Market Observations

Another perfectly normal day in the market, marked by the totally logical run up in stocks, bonds, commodities... and the USD. Why is the USD stronger? Some of the commentary suggests this is due to risk aversion trades – but US equities are higher, oil is higher and many point to this week’s economic data as suggestive of economic stability. So in the search of more satisfying explanations:
1) The month-end flows. While we think most of the flows should be EUR positive there is a natural mismatch to the week. Many of those that need March 31 as their closing date may be trading now rather than waiting for the exact fix next week. The US passive hedgers seem to be dominating today rather than Europeans – making the USD bid.
2) The ECB. Worry is high that the ECB is behind the deflation curve – witness the series of really ugly confidence numbers from Europe today. The ECB catch-up to QE is a risk and its being priced into the EUR.
3) Positions.
Its really quite simple – anyone that is bearish USD is being punished right now as US assets do better.
4) FED QE
concerns were overblown – this is a key and very worrying risk for market – as the FED buying of $7.5 bn US Treasuries yesterday didn’t lower US rates. In fact the US Treasury issued $34 bn in 5Y notes overwhelming the effect of the FED action. Market has sold bonds this week as economic data turned and as the FED actions are proving insufficient to turn the market around. Until and unless we get negative CPI prints the market won’t believe that US bonds aren’t rich. Also the market suffers from asset allocation where bonds are being sold to buy equities to reweight battered portfolios. All of this supports the USD, as it's an indication of tighter conditions. Eventually this will hurt growth outlooks and stocks but not just yet, as stock buyers are tempting fate under the soothing chants of the CNBC and the Geithner siren brigade, who seem to practice their Jedi mind tricks oh so successfully on the investing public every single day.
5) Technicals. On the technicals we are far from any level where the EUR is going to be in trouble for another shot at 1.3750 or 1.39. Yet all the momentum players are watching a sagging market and giving up. The 1.3250 or 1.3120 support seems far far away. The interest in USD buying in EUR has put pressure on JPY as well and the technical line to watch there is 98.70 which we saw tested briefly a few moments ago.
6) Fundamentals. If you read the stories below – more regulation from SEC and US Treasury; more doubts about the US banking system as the Senate pushes back on more bank bailout funds and Lacker highlights the need for stress tests. The mix of data hasn’t been positive or negative – so arguing that anything new has hit the tapes about economy or policy misses the point.

In other news, what is the SEC seeing about money market accounts that others aren't? It is no secret that the SEC will not react to a vicious dog attack until the fido has planted its mollars deep in the commission's gluteus maximus.
Thus one is left to wonder what Mary Schapiro knows when she told congress that U.S. securities regulators will bolster the regulation of money market funds and the protection of investors who entrust their funds to broker-dealers and investment advisers. In testimony prepared for a Senate Banking Committee hearing, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said the agency is considering ways to improve the credit quality, maturity, and liquidity standards applicable to the money market funds. Schapiro also said SEC lawyers are working on a plan to require investment advisers with custody of client assets to undergo an annual third-party audit, on an unannounced basis, to confirm the safekeeping of those assets. We smell smoke...

Lastly, Senator Kent Conrad had some amusing quibs about Obama's recent spending rampage reminiscent of a valley girl's first trip to soon-to-be-bankrupt-unless-inevitably-bailed-out-as- systematically-imporant Nordstrom's with daddy's gas card, better known as the taxpayer's printing press. As is widely known,
Obama has requested in his budget $250 billion, to add to the $700 billion widely-criticized financial bailout fund. But the chairmen of both the House of Representatives and Senate Budget Committees refused to include it in their budget plans. Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad told National Public Radio that he would not include it "when there is no plan as to how to use the money and no assertion by the administration that they're even certain it would be needed." The bailout fund was originally designed to prevent a complete meltdown of the financial system by taking bad real estate investments off institutions' balance sheets to get credit flowing again. But lawmakers have panned it for not doing the job sufficiently. Obama's request for more money came in his budget proposal for fiscal 2010, which begins on Oct. 1. But it was described as a "placeholder" and White House officials said that they may not seek the extra funds from Congress, where lawmakers are now drawing up their own budget plans. Both congressional budget committees quickly jettisoned it, giving them an easy way to cut massive red ink from their budget plans for the few years. The Congressional Budget Office last week forecast that Obama's budget would make the deficit balloon by $9.3 trillion through 2019, $2.3 trillion more than forecast by the White House. "You know, when you lose $2.3 trillion in a revenue forecast, we simply can't budget money for things that are theoretical," Conrad told NPR.

The schizophrenia-cum-amnesia in U.S. capital markets has reached an unprecedented stage. From utter despair a mere 3 weeks ago to irrational exuberance currently, the conviction in the infallibility of the financial system is hindering all administration attempts to extract nickels and dimes from the taxpayer for the financial armageddon boogeyman. And as most traders will confirm, there are many more invisible hands in the current market than even the most vetted conspiracy theorist will attest. The last time macroeconomic second derivatives indicating existing home sales, or economic spending are "slowing
", despite all primary indications still showing much more pain is in store, last caused a 20% rally in, well, never... Anyway, long story short, in order to demonstrate the weakness of the financial system, and to get a quick signature for any bailout placeholders, we would not be at all surprised to see stock borrow of Citi (and other financial) shares mysteriously come back with a vengeance. Bottom line is that the administration has realized it can effectively fly even the most egregious hedge fund enriching, and treasury debt multiplying proposal past the US public which is only transfixed by day-to-day market gyrations and the occasional flare out of populist anger against 10-20 Salem witches who are singled out by the WSJ and NYT for collecting bonuses. In the meantime, that great sucking noise you hear is the greatest wealth transfer in decades, transferring some marginal peace of mind to the current generation at the expense of the great unknown of the future. But when we are talking $9.3 trillion deficit increases in 10 years, who really gives a damn. After all, it is Nordstrom's, and the valley girl will not have to worry about a 3rd term (and very likely a 2nd one either).

Also thanks to reader Michael for his donation and kind words. Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, April 12, 2009

Observations On The U.S. Debt

Some observations on the total U.S. debt (the number are conservative) without commentary. The total is subject to interpretation and the probabilistic treatment of contingent liabilities and guarantees as well as the netting of derivative notionals.

Total US Debt so far: $115 - $315 Trillion dollars? (excluding/including derivatives notional)

$380,000 - $1,037,000 per person.

The break out:

$9.7 Trillion in bailouts
$11 Trillion in national debt
$17 Trillion in corporate/financial debt, and $13.8 Trillion in household debt
$1 Trillion in credit card debt
$10.5 Trillion in mortgages
$52 Trillion in social security/medicare obligations
Like other government trust funds (highway, unemployment insurance and so forth), the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds exist purely for accounting purposes: to keep track of surpluses and deficits in the inflow and outflow of money. The accumulated Social Security surplus actually consists of paper certificates (non-negotiable bonds) kept in a filing cabinet in a government office in West Virginia. These bonds cannot be sold on Wall Street or to foreign investors. They can only be returned to the Treasury. In essence, they are little more than IOUs the government writes to itself.
$200 Trillion in U.S. bank derivatives (notional)

Total excluding derivatives: $115 Trillion
Total including derivatives: $315 Trillion

In budgetary context:

$2.3 Trillion budget deficit this year, $10 Trillion in the next 10 years.

In the context of the consumer balance sheet:

$20.5 Trillion of residential real estate
$8.8 Trillion of equities
$7.7 Trillion of deposits and cash
$4.1 Trillion of consumer durable goods
$1.6 Trillion of corporate bonds
$960 Billion of municipal securities
$920 Billion of agency paper
$273 Billion of treasury notes and bonds

Total: $44.9 Trillion

My question is: everyone knows the social security underfunding can not be funded - it is a matter of 10 years at most before we hit the SS wall... and yet we brush it under the carpet. Does this mean we have 10 years at best before the economy collapses and thus we will just speculate on increasing market volatility, gambling more and more each day, until the emperor's clothes are revealed? What are the unintended consequences of trading for the sake of trading and increasing volatility?What happens after the SocSec obligations can no longer be postponed. Is this a problem that can be inflated as well, and is the magnitude of the inflation necessary to plug a $50 trillion domestic hole too big for the global financial system? Also, is the $1.2 quadrillion in listed and OTC derivatives (essentially vol bets) which is an unprecedented number, a direct inferrence of the increasing desire by all market participants merely to speculate instead of invest?

(for commenters, i bring your attention to the fact noted above that these numbers are subject to interpretation - this is merely meant to provide a frame of reference for the U.S. problem)
Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Some More Facts About How The CDS Market Will Be Misconceived To Death

When you have the House Agriculture Committee getting involved in the regulation of the CDS market, it is only a matter of time before it is game over. When both conventional wisdom, and economists-turned-philosophers like Soros claim that credit default swaps are responsible for the downfall of western civilization, presenting any type of factual information is pretty much useless. Nonetheless, Zero Hedge will fight until the Soros-spearheaded bitter end of "efficient" markets, to prevent what is basically the scapegoating of a risk-mitigating mechanism in order to deflect the public attention from what has been a phenomenal failure in risk-management by a handful of greedy Wall Street fatcats... It is not the market that is as fault - it is the people who abused it (here's looking at you AIG).

As we have noted, the DTCC finally started releasing somewhat detailed data in November about the CDS market. Unfortunately it was too late, and it seems only 3 people in the entire world follow what is says. So let us summarize it simply: 1) the market is already on a death spiral in terms of gross notional, and 2) the net notional of outstanding CDS is woefully inadequate to protect from the upcoming default onslaught in cash bonds.

What is the difference between gross and net notional? The gross number indicates the total notional of CDS contracts without taking into consideration offsetting trades. As the bulk of CDS notional holdings are at broker dealers who (aside from now defunct prop desks) take little principal risk, most of the CDS contracts they hold are offset. This means that for any $10 million CDS in a single name or index a B/D sells to counterparty X, the B/D has to purchase an offsetting $10 million from a different counterparty Y in order to be risk neutral. And so while the two transactions result in gross notional of $20 million outstanding, the net impact is 0. As the CDS data that had been previously available (which was never that much to begin with), was all on a gross basis, it tended to substantially exaggerate the total risk exposure in the market, and might have misled financial titans such as Mr. Soros himself. And as the charts below will show, the size of the net notional CDS market is troubling - in that it may in fact be too little.

While the gross notional size of the CDS market did grow significantly in recent years, there has been a very troubling decline recently in gross amounts. From a peak size of $62 trillion in 2007, gross notional CDS size has dropped to $28 trillion, with a run-rate weekly decline of almost $1 trillion, if DTCC is to be trusted. Interestingly, the gross notional on single names is for the first time on par with the size of the comparable cash bond market, both at about $14 trillion. If one actually were to delta hedge all bonds per the agriculture department's proposal, the argument would go that the market now is in equilibrium... at least based on a gross exposure.



The decline in the gross size is troubling: the overshoot to the downside over the past 6 months is almost as large as the ramp up during the peaking of the credit bubble. Data indicates the bulk of the change is in the index and tranche components of total gross, with single name gross size declining less acutely.


Which leads to the net CDS market exposure. Another way to think of net is how the general public thinks of gross: it is the total amount of cash that would change hands if every single reference entity were to suffer an event of default with a 0% recovery. And the total amount is a paltry $2.6 trillion, at least when juxtaposed to such previous hyperbole as $50 + trillion. Additionally, as the total cash bond market is $14 trillion, one could argue that the net notional does not nearly hedge enough of the cash market in the case of spreading defaults. ZH has shown before how market values of Investment Grade and High Yield indices imply there is a blended cumulative default risk of up to 40% over the next 5 years (assuming a high 40% recovery rate), the (simplified) argument would go that of the $14 trillion in cash bonds, up to $5-6 trillion could default. This number is therefore underhedged by up to 75%: there is a total of $2.6 trillion in total net, but only $1.4 trillion net in singe name CDS (excluding indices and index tranches which are used by index correlation trading desks as trading vehicles, not hedging instruments, and would promptly collapse when defaults start to really pick up).


Zero Hedge argues that CDS has been probably the most efficient way to hedge credit risks in the past 3 years. The fact the insurance companies took Buffett's example 10 steps too far, and just kept on selling and selling protection (kinda analogous to how the U.S. is printing and printing $$$ now) assuming six sigma events would never occur, thereby exposing the entire financial system to systemic risk, is solely their mistake and the appropriate punishment should have been default. An efficient market would have eventually picked up the pieces from AIG's failure, so the course that Paulson departed on when he bailed AIG out just takes that mistake even further as it merely leverages the faulty disbelief in fat tail events. The argument goes that CDS and equity markets are self referential when gossip picks up and companies like Bear and Lehman get shorted to death as fear is rampant. There are many more pieces to this argument, but we think it is totally meritless (in Lehman's case CDS traders would not purchase protection blindly as they were worried a Bear Stearns bail-out type event would reoccur making all CDS contracts virtually worthless; the government is as much to blame for being unable to hold a consistent policy course w/r/t how to deal with bank failures). The flipside is that CDS provide the only mechanism to hedge credit risk, which at implied 40% default probabilities, will need to be hedged even more so in the future.

So what is in store? Granted the death of CDS is an exaggeration, CDS will soon move from trading Over The Counter to a centralized Clearinghouse exchange, maybe in as little as 3 months. Initially this market will support indices (HY and IG) and subsequently move to index tranches and single name CDS. The clearinghouse will eliminate counterparty risk as contracts will be netted multilaterally, not just between two entities. Dealers would face a centralized cash-rich entity: The Clearing Corp (TCC), which would be funded through initial and daily collateral postings and cash flow sweeps on mark-to-market CDS margins. The biggest benefit from this would be the sharing of losses by all counterparties in case of a systemic failure.

Once counterparty risk is removed two things will happen: basis trades will collapse and the overall CDS levels will likely spike dramatically (wider). Due to aforementioned liquidity constraints (here and here), true risk levels are captured by spreads on cash bonds, not CDS. The counterparty premium is manifested by an artificial tightening in single-name CDS vis-a-vis matched maturity bonds (the negative basis trade phenomenon), and represents anywhere between 200 and 500 bps in any reference entity. Thus once a clearinghouse is established, as long as economic fundamentals maintain their scary downward trajectory and defaults are expected to keep rising, CDS will move steadily wider until they catch up with the true risk levels as currently expressed by Z Spreads (or interpolated recovery levels on highly convex names). Bottom line: we recommend purchasing CDS outright in any name that has a marked negative basis as counterparty risk becomes a negligible issue.
Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Secondary Market Debt Buybacks To Skyrocket

While everyone is busy arguing over the stimulus bill, without having a clue what its over 1000 pages of "stimuli" include (it is actually split into a 496-page appropriations section and a 577-page tax package), the government is making sure that corporations with public debt trading at a steep discount go out at first opportunity and do open market debt buybacks. We wrote about the recent pick up on secondary debt buybacks here, and now it is likely to become a frenzy due to tax incentives that the bill has in its final form. Fixed income funds are likely to front run companies, resulting in a steep increase in prices of bonds that have the potential to be repurchased.

The specific proposal introduced by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D, Montana) calls for deferrals of taxes on gains from debt repurchases at discounted levels. Any income realized from debt buybacks in 2009 and 2010 will be deferred to 2011 and then taxed ratably over an eight year period, through 2018. Let's demonstrate: if an issuer buys $1 billion of its debt at 50 cents on the dollar, the result is a $500 million capital gain and $100 million tax bill at a 20% statutory rate. With the current proposal, assuming a two-year deferral and pro-rata payment over 8 years, the present value of the tax payments becomes $54 million - a $44 million pick up in value! The difference is substantial and could potentially be distributed pro-rata to the company and its bondholders, implying the repurchase price could be increased by 5-6 cents. This could lead to a whole new form of company-bondholder negotiations, especially for large companies whose debt is trading at a large discount.

As a large portion of debt trades at distressed levels, with 70% of the HY market and 12% of investment grade trading at distressed spreads over 1000 basis points, this proposal would create large incentives for companies to consider buying bonds in the open market.

Even prior to this proposal, with its embedded benefits, companies had been aggressively buying back debt over the past 2 months (table below). As we discussed in the linked article, the benefits to a company from open market repurchases are numerous. It is likely that the stimulus bill will incite even more companies to buyback their own distressed debt, and asset managers to piggyback on this trend by pre-purchasing the bonds of companies they believe are most likely be bought up in open market repurchases. However, investors will have to be very careful not to misprice the overall high yield market higher, which as we wrote yesterday, could potentially be rich to the tune of 14 points based on a set of expected default and recovery rates.

Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

"For Its Bonds To Have Value, GM Has To Generate Positive Earnings"

Such is the punchline of rating agency Egan-Jones, which did not drink the equity market kool aid today and reaffirmed it D rating on the company. With GM shares trading barely changed despite the company's announcement it is effectively bankrupt, it is curious what shareholders expect out of the upcoming in- (most likely) or out-of-court restructuring. Yes, there is always the possilbe hail mary option value that Kirk will come out of left field and offer to buy the company, pledging the MGM Mirage as collateral (again) but aside from that? If bonds take a 90 cents plus haircut the best equityholders can hope for is 1% warrants struck roughly 50,000% out of the post-reorg money. Here is what EJ had to say:
More pressure for bondholders to convert to equity as GM announces that they will not pay its $1B in interest payments due June 1st. For GM's bonds and shares to have any reasonable value, it has to generate positive operating earnings. (We doubt GM can generate operating earnings.) We look for a default where the bond holder gets primarily equity as the gov't tries to get concessions from every corner to keep GM running albeit as a much smaller company. GM has received $13.4B from the gov't and is expected to get another $5B shortly. GM must have a plan for auto sales closer to 9M units per year down from their current estimates of 10.5M units. Feb.sales were down 47% to the lowest level in 27 years. We affirm our "D" rating.
Zero Hedge is still curious about the potential for equitable subordination here with regard to the government tranche (loan or equity, Geithner and Chooch still haven't quite decided). Bondholders have been antagonized to such an extent that the odds of this kind of lawsuit in bankuprtcy court are getting bigger by the minute. Sphere: Related Content

Friday, March 13, 2009

Univision Latest Member Of PIK Club

Broadcaster of Mexican soap operas Univision just made credit bubble investors even more sorry to have bought into its GS underwritten March 2007 Pay In Kind (PIK) bond, after disclosing in an 8K filing last night that it would PIK the September 15 interest payment on its 9.75% Senior Notes due 2015, and the in-kind election would extend indefinitely into the future. As reason for the PIK election the company stated the following:
The Company has elected to pay PIK Interest in the amount of approximately $79 million for the interest period commencing on March 15, 2009 to enhance liquidity in light of the current uncertainty in the financial markets.
No surprise there.

This latest PIK election brings the total of toggling PIK bonds to 22 or more than half of all outstanding, as of the 52 PIK notes have been issued, 6 have been redeemed and 2 have filed for bankruptcy, while Harrah's recently reduced the size of its PIK issue by $350 million. The remaining 22 issues amount to $17.7 billion. The 22 bonds in which investors are likely to never again see any cash payments (if default expectations are any indication) prior to their eventual bankruptcies are the following:

• American Media Operations 14% subordinated partial PIK notes due 2013
• Berry Plastics 11% subordinated partial PIK toggle notes due 2016
• Claire's Stores 9.625% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015
• Digicel 9.125% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015 (note: reverted to cash-pay)
• Freescale Semiconductor 9.125% senior PIK toggle notes due 2014
• Harrah's Entertainment 10.75% senior PIK toggle notes due 2018
• HCA 9.625% second-lien PIK toggle notes due 2016
• Intelsat Bermuda 11.5% senior PIK toggle notes due 2017
• iPayment 11.625% senior PIK toggle notes due 2014
• Laureate Education 10.25% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015
• Metals USA L+600 senior PIK toggle FNS due 2012
• Momentive Performance Materials 10.125% senior PIK toggle notes due 2014
• National Mentor L+637.5 senior PIK toggle notes due 2014
• Neiman Marcus 9% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015
• Noranda Aluminum L+400 senior PIK toggle FRNs due 2015
• Noranda Aluminum Holdings L+575 senior PIK toggle FRNs due 2015
• Realogy 11% senior PIK toggle notes due 2014
• Symbion Healthcare 11% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015
• TXU (Texas Competitive Electric Holdings) 10.5% senior PIK toggle notes due 2016
• TXU (Energy Futures Holdings) 11.25% senior PIK toggle notes due 2017
• Univision 9.75% senior PIK toggle notes due 2015
• US Oncology L+450 step-up PIK toggle notes due 2012

If analyzed by private equity backer, it would seem that TPG is in the most trouble as of its 11 PIK notes, it has opted to toggle 7 of these including Aleris (in ch.11), Freescale, Harrah's, Neiman Marcus, US Onco and TXU. Additionally, ZH would not even recommend to look at Apollo's bonds as an indication of the PE company's status as everyone pretty much knows the answer to that one already. Sphere: Related Content